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ABSTRACT
Cognitive biases influence decisions and the analyses of risk. They are often derived
from two separate processes: bias based on familiarity (familiarity bias) and bias as the
result of influences from outside sources (persuasion bias). Research suggests that
familiarity-based bias may lead to acceptance of an activity’s drawbacks and a leniency
of its risks.
In addition, research has tried to measure and analyze different types of biases
individually, but few have compared the interactions of more than one bias at once.
Because different biases may derive from different mental phenomena it is important to
tease out the distinctions, and observe how they interact with each other. This study
conducted an empirical test that attempted to answer the following questions: Does
familiarity and affiliation of the topics of radiation, low-earth orbit, and space travel
result in a lesser concern, and therefore leniency, of the risks involved? How effective is
on-the-spot persuasion when discussing risk assessment? How well does increased
familiarity of a high-risk activity protect against on-the-spot persuasion?
Surveys were distributed to 409 students from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University. The surveys were meant to collect the familiarity and preference levels of the
participants regarding commercial space travel; they were also meant to expose the
participants to persuasion conditions in order to influence their perceptions of risk. Nonparametric tests were performed in order to test the interactions. Data show that no
significant bias occurred as the result of persuasion; however significance was detected
between participants with high familiarity and low familiarity when they were not
intentionally persuaded. Implications of these results are included.
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Introduction
Risk is inherent is most activities; assessments are therefore necessary for any
activities that may have increased risk. Information alone however is not enough, for it is
often influenced by many factors. These factors include ways in which information is
delivered, the expectations of the recipients (DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener, &
Braverman, 2004), and the time available for processing the information (Ubel, 2002).
Predictable patterns in the way that these factors influence the information processing are
known as biases, and they alter interpretation of information as it travels from the
informer to the informed. Therefore, for it to be properly conveyed, information must be
presented using an understanding of how organizers, as well as the public, process
information (Kahneman, 2003).
Commercial space tourism, for example, is currently an activity whose risks are a
fresh topic of interest to private companies and to the public. Travel to or beyond lowearth orbit (LEO) was traditionally only available to government space programs like the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Russian Federal Space
Agency (Roscosmos) (NCRP, 2000; Turner, Farrier, Mazur, Walterscheid, & Seibold,
2008). Space travel is now considered to be a big business venture and investment. Some
individuals have already paid millions of US dollars to simply sit-in on missions to
earth’s orbit, but the average current asking price for such an activity is approximately
$200,000-$300,000 (Crouch & Laing, 2004). Plans have been drafted in order to send
civilians into LEO commercially for the past decade, and seats have already begun to sell
(Turner et al., 2008).
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Crouch and Laing (2004) report that “There is no doubt that the successful
emergence of the industry will depend to a very great extent on the efforts of the industry
to inform and educate the public.” The assessment of risk relies on the information that is
available, and opinions of commercial spaceflight are varied. It is in the interest of future
private investors to understand what people think about this activity, why they think that
way, and how an understanding of this can affect how people respond to it (Crouch &
Laing, 2004). It is therefore important to identify the biases of the public as well as biases
of the project organizers. For example, the material in informed consent documents and
training programs are under-addressed issues, especially when it comes to risk
assessment and decision making (Turner et al., 2008; Ubel, 2002). Given the dangers
inherent in space travel, it is likely that the new space tourists will have to agree to the
terms and conditions specified in an informed consent document, and participants may
need to receive some training prior to their journey.
Lastly, studies in human cognition have thus far attempted to examine individual
biases as well as their behaviors and origins. Few studies however have simultaneously
compared the interactions of more than one (potentially conflicting) bias. The discussions
that follow will provide support that different types of biases may be the aftermath of
different types of mental activity. Measuring the differences between these underlying
activities, as well as how they behave in the presence of others, is necessary in order to
understand a wider perspective of bias influence.
This study discusses biases and their effects on preference, risk perception and
risk assessment. It explores contemporary theories, defines types of biases, and attempts
to understand their interactions with each other. Finally the results of an empirical test of
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influence will be described that, it is hoped, will help better understand how biases affect
each other as well as how they can affect the perceptions of risks and threats.
Cognitive Biases
The mind has a tendency to misrepresent reality (Birch & Bloom, 2007; Sharp,
Viswanathan, Lanyon, & Barton, 2012). Biases that are responsible for this are the
products of experience (Gibbons, Houlihan, & Gerrard, 2009; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby,
& Chance, 2002; Sargeant, Majowicz, Sheth, & Edge, 2010), selective perception
(Cavalheiro, Vieira, Ceretta, Trindade, & Tavares, 2011; Corazzini, Pavesi, Petrovich, &
Stanca, 2010; Gilovich, 1993; Greenwald, 1980; Kahneman, 2003; Öhman, Flykt, &
Esteves, 2001), limited rationality (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989; Corazzini et
al., 2010; Fehr & Tyran, 2008; Kahneman, 2003), habits (Kahneman, 2003; Levesque,
Copeland, & Sutcliffe, 2008; Stewart & Payne, 2008; Taylor, 2009), an illusion of control
(Greenwald, 1980; Kos & Clarke, 2001), and/or opinion versus fact discrepancies
(Greenwald, 1980). These can develop through a person's conscious or unconscious selfinterests (Levesque et al., 2008).
Gilovich (1993) says that “beliefs are like possessions, of which we are
possessive.” Beliefs are strongly attached to the formation of biases; these beliefs and
prior experiences affect how, and to what, people pay attention (Bogaerts, et al., 2010;
Gibbons et al., 2009; Kahneman, 2003). People often notice or ignore things that they
have been conditioned to notice or ignore. This selective perception is subjective because
it varies between individuals (Cavalheiro et al., 2011; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989). For
example, phobics tend to have sensitivities to things like snakes or spiders (Öhman et al.,
2001), and people are more sensitive to stimuli if they perceive them as threatening
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(Bogaerts et al., 2010; Senay & Kaphingst, 2009). In addition, people have extreme
difficulty ignoring things that are exclusive and/or important to only them (Camerer et
al., 1989; Das, de Wit, & Stroebe, 2003; Sharp et al., 2012) like their names (Harris &
Pashler, 2004). Greenwald (1980) explains that the ego causes this limited perception,
and therefore people only assess the world based on how, or if, it affects them in some
way.
Traditionally judgments have also been considered biased if they exhibit a
bounded and limited rationality (Cavalheiro et al., 2011; Camerer et al., 1989; Charness
& Gneezy, 2003; Corazzini et al., 2010; Ubel et al., 2009; Fehr & Tyran, 2008;
Kahneman, 2003) as a result of emotions and misperceptions (Gibbons et al., 2009;
Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Meschiari, 2009). This is called systematic irrationality, and it
is a deviation or deficit in the use of practical and pragmatic frameworks, models, or
procedures of thought and inquiry (Fehr & Tyran, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Meschiari,
2009; Sharp et al., 2012). This occurs more frequently when assisted by egocentricity
(Birch, 2005; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Greenwald, 1980), cognitive business (Gilbert &
Osborne, 1989; Stewart & Payne, 2008), ill health (Ubel, 2002), emotion (Cavalheiro et
al., 2011; DeSteno et al., 2004; Ubel, 2008), stress/fatigue (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, &
Gilovich, 2004; Stewart & Payne, 2008), vagueness/uncertainty/ambiguity (Bogaerts et
al., 2010; Cavalheiro et al., 2011; Charness & Gneezy, 2003; Donaldson, Gooler, &
Scriven, 2002; Gilovich, 1993; Lin, Lin, & Raghubir, 2003; Sharp et al., 2012), or
persuasion (Corazzini et al., 2010; Demarzo, Vayanos, & Zwiebel, 2003). The end result
is faulty decision making based on deficient judgmental capabilities. For example, Fehr
and Tyran (2008) conducted experiments involving financial simulations. During these
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simulations participants were placed through a sequence of scenarios, and their methods
of navigating the scenarios were measured. The results of this study support the idea that
people, when distracted by environmental and inter-personal stimuli, may deviate from
rational and systematic decision-making models, and then they will make choices based
on this (sometimes misleading) input (Sharp et al., 2012).
Habits also reinforce bias, for they may be formed by the subjective drives of an
individual (Levesque et al., 2008; Stewart & Payne, 2008), influences of the environment
(Berry, Shanks, & Henson, 2006; Senay & Kaphingst, 2009), or by biology and evolution
(Meschiari, 2009; Nairne, Pandeirada, Gregory, & Van Arsdall, 2009). The social
environment is one of the strongest determinants of habits, for it can install a sense of
value, purpose, belief, or belonging (DeSteno et al., 2004; Gibbons et al., 2009; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974). Once people become comfortable with routine, it can often be
difficult to change. Therefore biases that are formed from habits are often difficult to
undo (Kahneman, 2003; Öhman et al., 2001). Levesque et al. (2008), for example, help
support the theory that perceptions and behaviors are automatically and unconsciously
guided by primed stimuli. This means that people will often react to situations in ways
consistent to past similar experiences and exposure.
Biases sometimes radically affect an individual’s locus of control, also known as
the illusion of control, which is the degree that a person believes that he/she directs things
that may be uncontrollable (Kos & Clarke, 2001; Taylor, 2009). This fallacy occurs when
people lead themselves to believe that they govern aspects of their lives, or aspects of the
world, that are mostly the effects of chance. For example, Charness and Gneezy (2003)
found that some gamblers believe that they can control probabilities of a known game of
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chance; this is also known as gambler’s fallacy (Gilovich, 1993). In addition, other
individuals that participate in group projects may mistakenly assume that they hold sole
responsibility for the project’s results instead of attributing them to the contributions of
the entire group (Greenwald, 1980).
Lastly, people can often be led by how they believe the world should be instead of
how it actually exists (Ball, 2002; Gilovich, 1993). The difference between the actual and
the ideal can sometimes become indistinguishable, and people may tend to believe that
their situation, or view of the world, is unchangeable regardless of overwhelming
evidence against it (Flyvbjerg, 2008). These are known as opinion versus fact
discrepancies (Greenwald, 1980).
To continue exploring how biases are formed the next few sections are dedicated
to their theories of origin. Afterwards an exploration of the different types of biases will
be presented. Because there are many forms of bias, most beyond the scope of this report,
only a handful will be discussed. The two main focal points will be familiarity bias and
persuasion bias, for they are the variables of influence for the current experiment. Others,
such as optimism, attribution, confirmation, hindsight, order, and knowledge biases, will
also be briefly discussed.
Explanations of Bias: History and Theories
Egocentricity, beneffectance, and cognitive conservatism.
Greenwald (1980) theorized that the three drivers of bias are egocentricity,
beneffectance, and cognitive conservatism. According to Greenwald, egocentricity occurs
when someone refers to their knowledge and experience as more valid sources of truth
than the input from outside sources. Beneffectance is a tendency for people to only claim
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responsibility for things that are positive, like success, and to refuse to claim
responsibility for things that are negative, like failure. Lastly, change can be undesirable
because it is perceived as difficult, uncomfortable, detrimental, or otherwise completely
unnecessary (Gilovich, 1993). Therefore many people prefer the concept of conservatism.
Conservatism is defined by an attempt to preserve what is already established; therefore
cognitive conservatism is people's attempts to retain a current belief or state of mind. This
desire to preserve is so strong that some are reluctant to admit that they have changed
their mind even if they have (Greenwald, 1980). This is reflected in the studies of
confirmation bias and hindsight bias; both of these will be discussed later. Egocentricity,
beneffectance, and cognitive conservatism can be demonstrated by professionals and lay
people alike, and awareness of these factors does not necessarily fix their influence
(Flyvbjerg, 2008).
The role of memory.
Biases and memory share a mutual relationship. This is because memory is
constantly shaped by bias, and similarly, biases require memory to exist (Greenwald,
1980). To explain further, the consolidation of memory from experiences condition
people, and they subsequently effect how people consolidate future memories (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). For example Nairne et al., (2009), as well as Tversky and Kahneman
(1974), argue that learning and memory are at the mercy of how an individual codes each
memory.
Some studies support the idea of a unitary memory system. For example a study
conducted by Berry et al. (2006) found no evidence of any influence of multiple memory
systems; however the findings of Klein et al., (2002) argue that the brain supports at least
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five different memory processes: working (short-term memory and attention), procedural
(memory of skills), perceptual (memory of the senses), semantic (memory of concepts),
and episodic (memory of events). Biases may develop through each of these types of
memories, or by combinations of them (Berry et al., 2006; Green, Fugelsang, & Dunbar,
2006; Klein et al., 2002; Seitz, Nanez, Holloway, Koyama, & Watanabe, 2005).
The studies of Kahneman (2003), Levesque et al. (2008), Wolfe, Butcher, Lee,
and Hyle (2003), support the philosophies of unconscious memories, such as unconscious
priming and memory consolidation, as well as their strong effects on behavior. Biases
formed by any of these can be easily developed, and they are often difficult to extinguish
(Öhman et al., 2001). Gilbert and Osborne (1989), Kahneman (2003), Senay and
Kaphingst (2009), and Stewart and Payne (2008) found that bias must be corrected early,
by corrective/effortful thinking, or the effects of nonconscious priming will be longlasting. The original focus of Gilbert and Osborne’s (1989) studies was to explore stress
and cognitive busyness as ways of intensifying bias decision making. While they
demonstrated that bias judgment occurs during times of cognitive busyness (e.g.,
distractions or stress), they also found that the effects can be corrected as long as
participants can recall the original influences that affected their judgment in the first
place. The act of mentally tethering knowledge to its source is called source monitoring
(Birch, 2005; DeMarzo et al., 2003) or mindfulness (Kahneman, 2003; Levesque et al.,
2008). If people cannot recall the origins of their bias then the influences that generated it
become untethered from conscious awareness, and the bias therefore remains (Wood,
2000). Gilbert and Osborne (1989) use the term metastasized to explain the biasing
effects of untethered information (unconscious priming or implicit memories). This is due
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to the term’s use in health and medicine: a cancerous tumor is much more difficult to
treat when portions of it metastasize (disconnect and spread around the body). To explain
all of this in another way, when primers or other influencers become disconnected from
explicit memory, and people are unable to recall from where they received their
information, then these influences are more likely to become internalized and cause bias
(Levesque et al., 2008; Wood, 2000).
Schemata and cognitive heuristics.
Biases are often derived from schemata (singular: schema) and cognitive
heuristics. Both of these are the product of automatic thinking (Bartlett, 1932; Stewart &
Payne, 2008). Schemata are basically clusters of knowledge that have been
compartmentalized into memory units; these units are quickly accessible to a person in
order to identify and define the properties, activities, and relationships among stimuli
(Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Meschiari, 2009). Heuristics are groups of schemata that are
arranged in specific ways in order to reach immediate conclusions about things (e.g.,
people, activities, or ideas). The main differences between the two are that schemata are
used in identification, and heuristics are used to form judgment. Both are, as said by
Meschiari (2009), the “primary paradigm of our species to interpret the complexity of
reality.” In other words they are mental short-cuts that allow for less inner cognitive
deliberation; this saves time and mental effort (Adaval, 2003; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984;
Cavalheiro et al., 2011; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Gilovich, 1993; Hall, Ariss, &
Todorov, 2007; Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Studies carried out by Klein et al. (2002) helped support the idea that human
behavior relies on a relationship between mechanisms that modify behavior based on new
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information (named “decision rules”), memory systems that store this information, and
processes that can retrieve and access the information at a later time (named “search
engines”). Engel, Fries, Singer (2001), Gilovich (1993), Greenwald (1980), Kahneman
(2003), Klein et al.(2002), Levesque et al. (2008), Meschiari (2009), Nairne et al. (2009),
and Öhman et al. (2001) support the idea that the cognitive and memory processes that
allow for biases derive from an evolutionary need for survival. The point is to establish
quick adaptive behaviors (Klein et al., 2002; Levesque et al., 2008), or to preserve some
type of order (Greenwald, 1980). Useful information that cause significant or beneficial
results for people will continue to influence behaviors at later times; the significant
information in these cases is then said to be primed (Levesque et al., 2008; Wolfe et al.,
2003). Primed information then develops cognitive recall priority more than other types
of information (Klein et al., 2002). Collections of information inevitably develop into
mental networks; this then leads people to exhibit automatic judgments and behaviors.
Those mental networks are considered the blue prints of schemata and cognitive
heuristics.
Fehr and Tyran’s (2008) financial simulations demonstrated that the constant use
of rational frameworks for decision making can be cognitively taxing. Therefore
heuristics can be formed by convenience. In addition, they may be encouraged by
effective mental 'weights' that are tied to them such as emotional reactions,
religion/beliefs, moralities, or social/cultural factors (Cavalheiro et al., 2011; DeSteno et
al., 2004; Gibbons et al., 2009; Kahneman, 2003). Overall, most schemata and heuristics
are developed by experiences and conditioning imposed by others or imposed by one's
self (Adaval, 2003; Bartlett, 1932; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984).
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Klein et al. (2002) showed that semantic-type generalizations (e.g., broad
concepts) are faster and easier to recall, but they can sometimes be deficient in accuracy.
Episodic memories (e.g., memories of events) provide better accuracy, but they are
burdened by slower and methodical serial (or controlled) processing. Therefore mentaldefault heuristics occur in parallel (or automatic) processing (Chaiken & Maheswaran,
1994; Gibbons et al., 2009; Stewart & Payne, 2008). They may be semantic in nature
because they are used most during times of stress, fatigue, distractions, or other situations
when cognitive resources are hindered (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Stewart & Payne,
2008; Ubel, 2002). The only exception to this appears to be under extreme forms of stress
or physiological activity (e.g., exercise) when no energy is available for even top-down
biases to occur (Bogaerts et al., 2010). Because the use of heuristics is easier then
overhauling a person’s current belief system they tend to be initially used unless there is
sufficient reason to deviate from them (Gilovich, 1993). Some reasons for deviation are
incentives and contradicting evidence (Das et al., 2003; Epley et al., 2004; Sharp et al.,
2012), or the persuasive guise of incentives or contradicting evidence (Corazzini et al.,
2010). This is ultimately how many biases are formed: experience-derived
generalizations are preferred over tedious detail extrapolation.
Internal versus external.
Although the idea of stimulus-driven and goal-driven processes is seen throughout
studies of memory and cognition, their proper nomenclatures sometimes change
depending on the phenomena being investigated. For example, the terms bottom-up/topdown tend to be used in studies regarding information processing (Engel et al., 2001;
Wolfe et al., 2003), the terms preattentive/postattentive have been used during studies of
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attention (Öhman et al., 2001), the terms inceptive/derived have been used during studies
of memory (Klein et al., 2002), and the terms informational forces/motivation forces have
been used in some cases of bias studies (Greenwald, 1980). Despite the arenas in which
these nomenclatures exist, they all describe the interactions of the ascending and the
descending perceptual pathways of the central nervous system.
One of the earliest models to propose this concept was the adaptive resonance
theory by Grossberg (1987); it was then later refined with the help of Carpenter and
Grossberg (2002). This real-time network model helps describe supervised and
unsupervised learning, and it suggests that information is synthesized or recognized by
the interplay of memory and the senses. The internal/external relationship and interaction
is the backbone of this theory. It states that data is originally received by the senses, and
it travels up ascending pathways to memory. Memory then guides further perception by
regulating the senses via descending pathways (Engel et al., 2001; Carpenter &
Grossberg, 2003; Grossberg, 1987).
What results from these models is the idea that decisions are made somewhere
within the parameters of the inside view and the outside view. Table 1 displays how
strengths of biases can be measured on one of these scales; one end is considered the
inside view and the other end is considered the outside view. The inside view represents
the egocentric side of the spectrum. It allows an individual to be tightly bound to their
own position; this is the position that they use to assess any new information. The outside
view is the opposite, for people develop their understandings based on actual real-world
information. Basically, the inside view is internally driven, and the outside view is
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externally driven (Engel et al., 2001; Flyvbjerg, 2008; Öhman et al., 2001; Wolfe et al.,
2003).
Table 1. Inside View/Outside View Spectrum
Inside View
Outside View
Top-Down
Bottom-up
Post-attentive
←–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––→ Pre-attentive
Derived
Inceptive
Motivational sources
Informational sources

Self-determination theory.
Because most biases are internally driven, it is important to discuss motivation
and how it becomes internalized. The self-determination theory (SDT) currently stands in
the forefront of this research. Constructed by Deci and Ryan (2000) this macro-theory of
motivation, personality, and optimal functioning basically explains that human
motivation occurs through different stages or avenues (Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004). The
processing through which people place themselves in order to become motivated can
affect the quality and autonomy of their resulting motivation. What this means is that
motivation is weaker and more effortful if people are driven to something when it leads
to the goal; in contrast, motivation is stronger and more automated when people are
driven to do something when it is the goal (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
SDT relies on three critical principles. First, humans are innately proactive instead
of passively controlled by all external sources. Next, humans are not the sole result of
social programming, but they instead self-organize in order to grow, develop, and
integrate. Lastly, although all of these qualities are inherent in humans, people still
require the right type of nurturing environments in order to capitalize on these inner
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capabilities. The idea is that people have inner drives to act, and their environments can
either hinder or encourage these drives (Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004).
SDT also explains that motivation is a regulatory process that may involve several
stages: amotivation, extrinsic motivation, and intrinsic motivation. Table 2 displays each
of these steps from absence of motivation to internalized motivation (Gagné & Deci,
2005). Amotivation represents a lack of drive; this occurs in the beginning before people
become interested or, in the end, when people lose interest. Motivation then becomes
activated through four types of extrinsic motivations: external regulation, introjected
regulation, identified regulation, and integrated regulation. During extrinsic motivation
people are driven to something as a means to a goal (e.g., exercising in order to look
attractive). Once intrinsic motivation is achieved people are driven to do something as the
goal itself (e.g., exercising because they enjoy doing it) (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Levesque
et al., 2008).
Table 2. Stages of SDT and Motivation (Gagné & Deci, 2005)
Amotivation

Extrinsic Motivation
External
Regulation

Absence of
intentional
regulation

Dependent on
reward and
punishment

Lack of
motivation

Controlled
motivation

Impersonal

External

Introjected
Regulation
Dependent on
self-worth
within a
community
Moderately
Controlled
Motivation

Somewhat
External

Intrinsic
Motivation

Identified
Regulation

Integrated
Regulation

Important for
goals, values,
and regulations

Assists goals,
values, and
regulations

Interest and
enjoyment of the
task

Moderately
Autonomous
Motivation

Autonomous
Motivation

Inherently
Autonomous
Motivation

Somewhat
Internal

Internal

Internal

Several methods of bias formation and attitude change follow similar avenues.
For example the transtheoretical model of behavioral change has been used by health
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psychologists as a model similar to SDT. This model utilizes a five-stage process that
people may use in order change unhealthy behaviors. These stages are precontemplation,
contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance. The precontemplation stage is
similar to amotivation because both involve the indifferent period of time before the
person is interested in psychological change. The contemplation and action stages are
similar to extrinsic motivation because they involve making the changes in response to
something (e.g., become healthier or save money). Lastly, the maintenance stage involves
keeping the desired behaviors. According to the theory, the maintenance stage is reached
after six months of adopting the new behavior; it may be during this time that the person
has associated the new behavior as a part of themselves. The transtheoretical model of
behavioral change is therefore another example of how SDT may be used practically in
real world settings (Prochaska, DiClemente, & Norcross, 1992; Prochaska, 1994).
Anchoring and adjustment theory.
According to the egocentric anchoring and adjustment theory (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), also known as recognition-primed decision making (RPD) (Klein &
Klinger, 1991; Klein, 2008; Klein, Moon, and Hoffman, 2006; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997),
people assess new situations and ideas by variously adjusting from their own knowledge
(Epley et al., 2004; Fehr & Tyran, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Senay & Kaphingst, 2009).
They do not completely abandon these beliefs in the presence of new ones, but instead
use their own experiences as check-points of judgments known as anchors. People
initially secure their own perspective, and then they selectively adjust it based on new
incoming information. The adjustments are typically discrete, and they will shift just
enough until people believe that they have encompassed the new perspective. If it is not
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encompassed, then more adjustments are needed. The idea is that the “anchoring” (or
securing) comes naturally and instinctively to the person, and then the “adjustment”
involves the conscious effort needed to cross the divide between their own anchor and the
anchors of others. If this divide is overcome, and the connections are established, then an
agreement or understanding is reached between the two perspectives (Epley et al., 2004;
Fehr & Tyran, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Senay & Kaphingst,
2009). These adjustments are not necessarily meant to bring people closer to accuracy,
but instead closer to another position. For example, when you talk to your friends you are
not necessarily trying to get them to understand what is correct; instead, you are simply
trying to get them to understand you or your perspective.
The idea of perception and perspectives is an important one. Pickens (2005)
proposed that perception is the process by which organisms interpret and organize
sensation, and this produces a meaningful experience of the world. In humans, this is
largely influenced by prior experiences. The same event can be experienced in different
ways, and our perceptions are bound to our experiences (Kahneman, 2003). Birch and
colleagues (2007) found that, as children, biases tend to be at their strongest (Birch, 2005;
Birch & Bloom, 2007). They then ease away with age because people learn laws of
nature as well as the perspectives of others. Under the right circumstances we are
eventually trained to abandon egocentricity in favor of the adaptive advantage of
understanding. For example, it is sometimes in the favor of people to understand the
views of the group instead of fixating on their own, or it benefits them to understand both
sides of an argument. As mentioned earlier, we will continue to see the world within the
parameters of our own biases unless given evidence or incentives to do otherwise (Das et
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al., 2003; Senay & Kaphingst, 2009). To some degree however we continue to allow our
perceptions to be egocentrically driven. In this case biases are not necessarily formed, but
they are instead maintained from birth (Epley et al., 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Anchoring and adjustment bias can be overridden or deactivated however. People
are inclined to adjust their perspectives more under persuasion techniques (DeMarzo et
al., 2003), or when incentives for accuracy are offered. Examples of these incentives are
rewards, like getting good grades, by understanding the points of view from other people.
Incentives for accuracy can be positive or negative, and can be represented by cash
rewards, or the risks of harm and death (Das et al., 2003; Senay & Kaphingst, 2009;
Sharp et al., 2012; Wood, 2000). Another way to maneuver around anchoring and
adjustment is to have information delivered from trusted sources such as friends, family,
or others within the same social group (e.g., political, religious, or ideological; Anolli,
Zurloni, & Riva, 2006; DeSteno et al., 2004). These are cases when “anchors” are less
likely to be initially dropped, and therefore people are more susceptible to a complete
overhaul of their beliefs (Epley et al., 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
As mentioned earlier other situations can have a reverse effect, and they can
instead encourage anchoring and adjustment. Due to impairment of cognitive resources,
errors due to biases occasionally thrive under stress. One reason for this is because some
types of memories are more resilient than others. Because short-term memory is much
more vulnerable to stress than long-term memory, people will often rely on aged and
trusted heuristics that they have maintained for a long time (Martinussen & Hunter,
2009). Epley et al. (2004) conducted experiments to identify the mechanisms with which
this phenomenon occurs. They found that adjustments are effortful, and are therefore
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taxed under circumstances that exhaust mental resources. Examples of these
circumstances are time pressures, fatigue, and other stressors (Chaiken & Maheswaran,
1994; Kahneman, 2003; Stewart & Payne, 2008). They are factors that inhibit people's
efforts to effectively utilize their cognitive abilities like attention and judgment; therefore
they will be less capable of optimally performing the mental work of adjusting. In these
cases the instinctive “anchor” will be dropped, but there will be less energy with which to
“adjust” very far from it. As a result people will more likely judge information from their
own perspectives instead adjusting or compromising with others’. In other words, we are
more egocentric when hurried or stressed (Epley et al., 2004; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989).
Phenomenon of unidimensional opinions.
Biases can be created from other biases; different types of biases can also attract
and adhere to each other. DeMarzo et al. (2003) explored models based on these
occurrences. They called them the phenomenon of unidimensional opinions, and they
explain that individuals’ beliefs regarding multiple issues can easily converge into one
extreme polar position (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Gilovich, 1993). One example that is
given is the “left-right” spectrum in U.S. politics (DeMarzo et al., 2003). If a person has a
powerful opinion on a single topic, such as pro-choice or pro-life, then they may
eventually feel inclined to associate and collaborate with others who maintain this same
opinion-such as liberals or conservatives respectfully (Callahan, 2004). Continued
exposure to these groups inevitably causes other tangential opinions to merge with that of
the groups’ (Senay & Kaphingst, 2009). As a result, many people will begin to adhere to
the beliefs of their respective social communities.
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This is because mental consistency is satisfying for people. Any inconsistencies
may lead to cognitive dissonance which is the inner mental conflict people have when
their attitudes, values, and behaviors conflict with one another. Cognitive dissonance
occurs more dominantly when there is some type of behavioral, motivational, or
emotional commitment to one or more of the conflicts between opinions (Greenwald &
Ronis, 1978; Wood, 2000). Wood (2000) provides an example of cognitive dissonance in
one of her studies. Both she and Callahan (2004) found that people who defined
themselves as Christian conservatives expressed pro-welfare attitudes when they were
identified by their religious positions (Christian), but they then expressed anti-welfare
attitudes when they were identified by their political position (conservative). In order to
overcome these contradictions higher order mental strategies are used; these will be
discussed shortly.
There are several theories on why beliefs and heuristic biases can become
clustered and connected. DeMarzo et al. (2003) explain that some beliefs relate to others
so well that they form thick mental associations. These associations become widespread
and inevitably merge different beliefs into clustered groups. Once the connections are
established, and the framework is laid out, it is sometimes difficult to see where one
belief ends and another begins-regardless of how many degrees of separation are present.
Propaganda, censorship, and marketing for example, often make it very easy to polarize
almost any discussion; they often encourage people to choose and maintain a specific
side (DeMarzo et al., 2003; Rankin-Box, 2006).
Other relationships however are harder to tie together. For example, in the United
States, those who belong to the traditional right endorse the idea of preserving life by
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abolishing abortion; however the same groups also support gun ownership, war, and the
death penalty. The question then forms: How can a group cherish human life, and then
support so many other forms of death? This leads some people to adopt the theory of
multiple attitudes. This theory explains that people can, in fact, own different and
contradicting opinions and attitudes instead of integrating them in a unidimensional way
(Wood, 2000).
Other theories are offered however that explains that, as different and conflicting
as some attitudes can be, they have the potential to be abstractly assimilated, related, and
unified. Green et al. (2006a) conducted studies of human analogical thinking and how
this allows people to lump ideas into categories and contexts. The relationships of some
broad ideas, or semantics, are obvious; for example “hand is to glove as foot is to sock”
provides very easy analogical mapping (hands wear gloves and feet wear socks). This is
called conventionalized semantic relation. Their study provided support for two main
concepts. The first concept is that categorization is a necessary mechanism for analogical
mapping; this means that in order to establish a relationship between two concepts they
first must be viewed as belonging within one specific group. For example hands go into
gloves just like feet go into socks. The second concept is that analogical and categorical
thinking can be unconsciously primed (Levesque et al., 2008; Wolfe et al., 2003); this
means that it is easier to make associations between two components if a context has
already been provided to aid in the pairing. Going back to the example of preserving life,
it is difficult to sell the idea that abolishing abortion will preserve life just like
guns/war/the death penalty will preserve life. If a context is provided however, such as
“the world is a dangerous place” and “protection from dangerous people makes the world
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less dangerous,” then the idea that guns, war, or the death penalty will preserve life
(primarily your life) seems more convincing and understandable. This is further
compounded if people’s cherished beliefs are invoked and manipulated (Callahan, 2004).
Once the category is established, then the analogy between two seemingly abstract ideas
can be produced; this is a process called abstract relational integration (Green et al.,
2006a). In another study, Green et al., (2006b) demonstrated that the parts of the left
frontopolar cortex of the brain is primarily activated during abstract relational integration;
this area is assisted by the parieto-frontal area which is normally activated during every
day working memory tasks. Although Green et al. (2006b) discuss this philosophy in
regard to thought processes of an individual person, its relevance is equally noticeable
when applied to broader social group thinking (Anolli et al., 2006; Rankin-Box, 2006).
Another consequence of the unidimensional nature of people’s beliefs is that ideas
are often lumped into moral categorical extremes. This means that ideas will not only be
placed into the left-right spectrum, but they may also be placed into right-wrong or goodbad spectrums (Anolli et al., 2006; Kahneman, 2003). Therefore it is sometimes difficult
to deliver some information in a neutral way. People come equipped with certain
sensitivities to issues that can turn the most harmless concept into a terrifying concern
(Das et al., 2003; Klein & Harris, 2009; Öhman et al., 2001; Senay & Kaphingst, 2009).
Strong emotions produce stronger polarizing and unidimensional decisions. Therefore
successful persuaders have learned that opinions are more susceptible if intense emotions
are invoked (Cavalheiro et al., 2011; DeSteno et al., 2004; Kahneman, 2003; Ubel, 2002).
At least initially, using topics or words that are dangerous or taboo in nature will capture
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attention (Aquino & Arnell, 2007), and they will spark intense attitudes that can launch
beliefs into extremes (Öhman et al., 2001).
Unidimensional opinions may be guided by informational influence, which is
information obtained for the sake of understanding knowledge. It may also be guided by
normative influence, which is information obtained for the sake of fitting into a group or
society (Gilovich, 1993; Wood, 2000). In either case, evidence of the phenomenon of
unidimensional opinions has been so overwhelming that people’s eventual position can
often be predicted based on their social networks (DeMarzo et al., 2003; Sargeant et al.,
2010). It could therefore be applied to commercial space travel. For example people may
discourage this activity if they are uncomfortable with the ideas of flying, upper
atmospheric environments, or human existence beyond planet earth. According to the
phenomenon, their pro-space travel or anti-space travel opinions may begin with one
single preference, and then related preferences will be absorbed until they eventually
grow into a multi-faceted, yet polarized, position.
Biological basis of bias.
Now that some basic psychological theories have been discussed, it is of value to
review the interactions between the physical components inside the body that may allow
for bias behaviors. Our nervous system, to include the brain, functions as a result of the
communication or “firing” between the individual cells called neurons. The firing of
these neurons causes mental processes such as memory, perception, attention, and
behaviors. Top-down influences begin in the prefrontal and parietal cortexes; these are
the areas in the top-front and top-middle portions of the brain. The influences are shaped
by positive reward signals and negative fear signals that are delivered primarily from the
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nucleus accumbens and the amygdala respectfully; both of these are located in the core of
the brain. These signals travel to higher cortical areas causing repeated neuronal firing, or
they travel down and out to lower levels of the nervous system through trails called
efferent pathways.
Bottom-up influences however begin in the sensory organs and nerve endings
located in the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and skin. These influences move up along portions
of the spinal cord called afferent pathways. Eventually sensory information reaches
another core-section of the brain called the thalamus. With the exception of the sense of
smell, the thalamus redirects all afferent sensory input to higher levels of the brain. For
more on the nervous system or the biological basis of behavior, see Pinel (2000).
Engel et al. (2001) compiled findings from neuroscientific studies in order to
theorize a biological sequence of events that cause bias behaviors. They argue that largescale interactions occur between the higher and lower brain areas. Signals from afferent
sensory pathways bombard the higher cortical cells (Engel et al., 2001). Continuous
activation of these cells then increases their sensitivity for subsequent activation; this
means that the more a cell is fired, the more it will fire when prompted by tangent cellular
activity (Klein et al., 2002). Translated into mental behavior, if cellular firing is tied to a
specific mental process, like memory, then the repetition of that thought process should
increase the likelihood of it happening again-as well as increase its speed when it does.
This process eventually causes clusters of cells to become internally
synchronized, which means that they fire within milliseconds of each other. Specific data
is encoded into specific cells that fire in unique patterns when the data is later recognized
by upward afferent information. Persistent firing can eventually initiate large scale
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influences; this means that they spread to other multiple regions of the nervous system
and recruit other groups of brain cells. All of these areas become integrated, and they are
then used simultaneously. When this happens, external stimulus is no longer necessary to
initiate cellular activity in these regions. Together these events encourage types of
memories, goals, decision making, anticipation, and other types of internal mental
phenomena (Engel et al., 2001).
Some of the signals generated from all of this activity are termed bias signals
because they become automated and may occur regardless of input from external sources
(Engel et al., 2001). Bias signals primarily operate in the gamma range frequency; this
means that they are the consequence of brain cells firing at a frequency of 20 to 100
hertz-with or without external stimulus. The bias signals from these higher areas are then
carried down to sensorimotor circuits where they can affect or prime these areas, that way
data is either swiftly recognized or ignored (Levesque et al., 2008). Both consequences
are caused by the continuous use or non-use of neurons, and they will either encourage
neuronal activation or suppress it respectively. This then allows data to be recognized
faster and with higher reliability, or cause it to be overlooked (Engel et al., 2001). In
other words, brain cells can be programmed for bias. They therefore affect that which we
attend to or ignore, or they affect what we find valuable or neglectable (Carpenter &
Grossberg, 2002).
In addition to the dynamic nature of higher cortical areas, neuroplasticity (the
structural and functional changing of neurons and their connections) is also observed in
lower-level processes like in the sensory organs. This is termed perceptual learning, and
it leads to automated biological consequences known as perceptual biases. Seitz et al.
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(2005) conducted studies that support the theories that environmental exposures can
program sensory thresholds in lower-level cellular areas of data processing. Their
experiments presented unsuspecting pilots with a virtual flight task. During the
simulations, 200 low-luminance dots, hidden in the display, moved in specific directions.
Although the pilots seemed unaware of the movements, directions, or presence of the
dots, the unconscious stimuli led to a false detection of motion after the dots were later
removed. Although top-down, higher cortical, processes cannot be completely ruled out,
this phenomenon can happen completely independent of attention and consciousness.
This effect can be seen not only for sight, but through other sensory modalities such as
smell, hearing, taste, and touch; refer to Seitz et al. (2005) for more on this.
Data/Frame Theory.
The Data/Frame theory provides alternative explanations to those that are offered
by theories of bias. According to Klein, Moon, and Hoffman (2006) people make sense
of the data they receive by mentally organizing all of it into frameworks of information;
these are known as frames. A frame can be considered as someone’s perspective or pointof-view. One reason for developing and utilizing frames is to create cause and affect
relationships that may be used later, and this saves time that is normally consumed by
extensive or difficult thinking. This is similar to heuristic biases with one exception:
biases are consciously or unconsciously designed by an individual in order to
automatically deliver immediate conclusions. Frames however are designed to be
malleable constructs that are changed and modified based on new information (Klein et
al., 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Table 3 shows the primary differences between
frames and heuristic biases. There is a close relationship between the two, however. For
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example, Klein et al. (2006) explain that frames can often affect the way information is
interpreted, and therefore frames may also be responsible for misperceptions normally
attributed to biases. In addition, Stewart and Payne (2008) provided evidence that some
of the most stubborn biases can demonstrate malleability, and they can change under the
right contextual, motivational, or attentional circumstances (e.g., priming and corrective
thinking).
Table 3. The Differences between Frames and Heuristic Biases.
Frames
Used to make sense of the world by
gathering and assessing new information
New data is used to change/modify when
needed.
Function as hypotheses about connections
between data
Knowledge that is malleable/dynamic

Biases
Used to make sense of the world by
making definitive conclusions
New data is perceived/interpreted in order
to complement existing belief
Functions as solid unchangeable beliefs
about connections between data
Knowledge that is fixed/static

Cognitive bias discussion.
It is the goal of existentialism to define the meanings in, and of, life; therefore it
enriches the discussion to end this section with existential theories of how bias is allowed
to exist. In this case the appropriate question may be: What drives people to believe, or
behave, how they do? Four ideas are provided in response to this question. Fredrick
Nietzsche offers the will-to-power; this explains that people do what they do in order to
gain control of their lives and become the masters of their domains. Sigmund Freud
offers the will-to-comfort; this explains that people do what they do in order to gain
pleasure or satisfaction (e.g., physical satisfaction or mental satisfaction). Victor Frankl
offers the will-to-meaning; this explains that people do what they do in order to gain
understanding about the world and their place within it (Pervin, 1960). Lastly Pickens
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(2005) explained how Fritz Heider brings the above theories together. He explained that
people do things in order to understand their world, so that they can feel in control of it.
This understanding and control over their lives then leads to general satisfaction (Pickens,
2005).
So far it appears that biases therefore stem from people’s need to achieve
meaning. It is an innate human need to identify patterns in nature, and there is an attempt
to extract an understanding based on these patterns. In this aspect, most humans often
tend to display characteristics of apophenia. Apophenia, introduced by Conrad (1958) as
Apophänie, is a psychological phenomenon in which people attempt to attach patterns
and meaning to otherwise completely random data. Meschiari (2009) discusses apophenia
as well as its visual and auditory manifestation: pareidolia. He explains how pareidolia
allows people to consolidate items in their vision in order to make a complete image: “In
a system of dark and light spots, the eye, stimulated by confused forms devoid of
autonomous meaning, analogically completes outlines and ambiguous masses, based on
the model of known images (pg. 6).” Examples provided by Meschiari are string figures
(an international game which interprets meaning from woven patterns of string between
fingers) and paleolithic art (ancient art in which the artists graphical emphasized random
dark spots on cave walls in order to transform the discolorations into animals or other
characters). Another example could include Rorschach tests; these are tests with which
people identify pictures in symmetrical and ambiguous images (Wood et al., 2000).
Apophenia, pareidolia, and other mental phenomena similar to them, are very well
known, and theories have been made regarding how they work. For example Treisman
and Gelade (1980) proposed the feature-integration theory of attention. This theory
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explains that pieces of sensory data, such as vague geometric shapes, first transverse
through multiple pathways of the brain. The initial areas code for things like colors,
shapes, locations, or movements; later areas of the brain, such as the parahippocampal
place area and the retrospenial cortex (Meschiari, 2009), are responsible for assembling
the pieces in order to combine them into a unified image. Also according to the featureintegration theory, certain combinations are cognitively “glued” together automatically
whereas more complicated images require attention. People instinctively integrate their
sensory experiences into a unified perception (Treisman & Gelade, 1980); similarly they
also show an instinctual desire to integrate various characteristics of their environments
into a unified understanding of the world (Meschiari, 2009).
These sense-making internal mechanisms that lead us towards “hyper-interpreting
natural signals (Meschiari, 2009, pg. 10)” have advantageous survival characteristics
from an evolutionary perspective (Gilovich, 1993; Kahneman, 2003; Levesque et al.,
2008; Meschiari, 2009). However some instances, as are the cases of some vestigial
features of humans (e.g., wisdom teeth or philoerection), these functions may be useless
or undesired by-products or side-effects, and they are derived from some other necessary
biological activity (Klein et al., 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Some of these
cognitive side-effects lead to persistent misperceptions that are unhelpful and sometimes
even potentially harmful (Charness & Gneezy, 2003; Gilovich, 1993; Kahneman, 2003;
Stewart & Payne, 2008). Taking everything together, it then appears that biases are ways
of allowing people to believe that they understand aspects of themselves and their world.
These perceptions of understanding may be inaccurate compared to real world contextual
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information, but regardless the perceptions may become grounded and persistent due to
the satisfaction that accompanies them (Meschiari, 2009).
Bias Types
The above section discussed theories of bias formation and modification. This
next section will present the different ways that biases manifest. As will be demonstrated,
each bias has its own behaviors as well as underlying cognitive mechanisms. Because an
evaluation of all types of bias is beyond the scope of this report, only biases related to the
experiment are offered. These are optimism bias, attribution bias, confirmation bias,
hindsight bias, order bias, knowledge bias, familiarity bias, and persuasion bias.
Optimism bias.
Optimism bias, or organizer bias, is typically found in people who are developers
of projects (e.g., commercial space travel). It is important not to confuse this type of bias,
an unintentional form of deception, with strategic misrepresentation, which is an
intentional form of deception (Flyvbjerg, 2008). Formerly known as the “planning
fallacy,” it normally occurs when people fail to compare their particular situations with
prior similar ones (Sargeant et al., 2010).
Lin, Lin, and Raghubir (2003) refer to optimism bias as self-positivity. They
conducted three experiments that tested self-positivity, the effects of mitigation, and their
effects on the perception of cancer risk. Those with high general optimism perceived their
probabilities of being diagnosed with cancer as lower than that of the rest of the
population. These perceptions changed when real-world statistical data, or base-rates,
were used as bias mitigation (Lin, Lin, & Raghubir, 2003).
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Like most biases, optimism bias tends to stem from an egocentric view, and this
leads people to believe that they are somehow exceptions to the norm (Kos & Clarke,
2001). One example of this bias is the Pollyanna principle, or the Pollyanna effect
(Matlin & Stang, 1978); this is when people intentionally avoid confronting or
contemplating potential problems. They instead assume that everything will work itself
out (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Optimism bias involves a tendency to over-inflate
advantages and underestimate disadvantages in order to perceive improvement where it
may not exist (Greenwald, 1980). It often involves underestimating costs, risks, and
timelines associated with projects and project completion. Optimism bias can be
beneficial at times by reducing anxiety (Kos & Clarke, 2001; Meschiari, 2009), to
increase self-esteem, or to just generally feel happy (Lin, Lin, & Raghubir, 2003),
however it can also lead to neglect-related problems like negative health consequences
(Kos & Clarke, 2001; Lin, Lin, & Raghubir, 2003; Sargeant et al., 2010).
Sources of optimism bias may not originate from within the person alone, but also
come from outside sources such as political pressures, organizational pressures, morals,
ethics, or culture (Anolli et al., 2006; DeSteno et al., 2004; Hirsch & Baxter, 2010;
Flyvbjerg, 2008; Sargeant et al., 2010). Optimism bias can be complicated by other
mental phenomena such as skill decay (Wisher, Sabol, Sukenik, & Kern, 1991) or
anchoring and adjustment bias (Epley et al., 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In a
strong professional culture, this can produce individuals whose confidence dangerously
outshines their actual skill level (Cavalheiro et al., 2011).
When people are convinced that they are well-informed in a topic, regardless of
how well they actually know it, then they are prone to use limited information in order to
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come to conclusions (Fehr & Tyran, 2008; Huberman, 2001; Kahneman, 2003). This can
be a problem if an accurate conclusion requires more information outside of the
knowledge that is available to them (Hall et al., 2007; Gilovich, 1993).
Attribution bias.
Attribution bias, also known as blame bias or self-serving bias, influences where
blame is placed. It often occurs between an observer and a participant. Because the points
of view of an event are often different, attributions of the event vary between the
perspectives of individuals. To put it in another way, determining causes of accidents and
risks is dependent on who is making the decisions (Gilovich, 1993; Martinko &
Thomson, 1998). Normally people who are directly involved in an incident will place
blame on factors outside of their control. Others that are not directly involved, like
spectators or upper management, will place the blame on factors inside the control of the
participants (Kouabenan, 2009; Martinko & Thomson, 1998). Attribution bias is similar
to the idea of beneffectance proposed by Greenwald (1980) as it agrees with the idea that
people attach themselves to positive consequences while also distancing themselves from
negative consequences. This occurs for risk assessment as well; this means that your view
of risks can change if you are an active participant instead of a spectator (Kouabenan,
2009; Martinko & Thomson, 1998).
Confirmation bias.
There are other examples in which knowledge can override perception. For
example, people will sometimes unconsciously seek ways to affirm what they already
believe; they choose to maintain their preferences and aversions, and they will often only
pursue sources that reinforce them (Cavalheiro et al., 2011; Das et al., 2003; Gilbert &
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Osborne, 1989). This is called confirmation bias (Klein et al., 2006) or the illusion of
validity (Gilovich, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Gilbert & Osborne (1989) say “The fabric of belief is indeed so tightly knit that
the dropping of a single stitch can induce a run throughout the entire bolt-and yet, this
basic psychological truism is not a conspicuous piece of our cultural wisdom.” People
who demonstrate this bias find it very difficult to be proven wrong. Confirmation bias is
also similar to Greenwald's (1980) explanation of cognitive conservatism, because it is an
attempt to preserve beliefs or states of mind that are already established. Confirmation
bias is, however, an attempt to preserve or fortify one's beliefs and perceptions by
actively pursuing and collecting input that compliment or affirm them (Greenwald,
1980). Those who exhibit confirmation bias will be attracted information that
complements their beliefs, and they will avoid, or show indifference, to things that
conflict with them. This tends to happen regardless of the strengths of either argument.
Confirmation bias is dangerous when combined with familiarity bias (explained below)
or optimism bias. This is because, collectively, these biases can lead people to think that
they know all information about a specific topic, and therefore they prohibit new vital
information from getting through.
Klein et al. (2006) use the Data/Frame Theory to argue that confirmation bias is
not a bias at all, but it is instead a frame that helps guide decision making. Gilbert and
Osborne (1989), as well as Tversky and Kahneman (1974), however argue that these may
be two different types of mental processes. As stated earlier, data/frame theory involves
the alteration of mental constructs in order to accommodate new information, and
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confirmation bias relies on the alteration of new information in order to preserve already
established mental constructs.
Hindsight bias.
When people receive information from outcomes, some mistakenly believe that
they knew-it-all-along even if they did not; this is known as hindsight bias. Cognitive
conservatism explains that some people prefer to think that their beliefs are fixed and
unchangeable. They are therefore unwilling to admit that they have changed their beliefs
even if they had done so (Greenwald, 1980). For example, Fischhoff (1975) conducted
studies that presented historical stories, such as the battle of Hastings, to participants.
Based on the group, the participants were or were not provided a conclusion to the story.
The participants who were provided the conclusion were much more likely to believe that
they would have already known the results beforehand. The opposite was the case for the
participants who had to guess the conclusions (Fischhoff, 1975). It therefore appears that
people assimilate and revise their opinions, whether they realize it or not, based on
information or influences to which they are exposed.
Order bias.
The sequence in which information is delivered can also influence how
information is processed (Greenwald, 1980; Ubel et al., 2009). A bias that is based on a
specific sequence of incoming information is called an order effect, or order bias. It
involves information that affect people’s attention and memory based on the order that it
is delivered (Morgan & Rothoff, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Primacy and recency biases (or effects) are examples of these. Primacy bias
occurs when people are more influenced by information that is delivered first
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(Greenwald, 1980); recency bias occurs when people are more influenced by information
that is delivered last (Ubel et al., 2009). To put it another way, their opinions depend on
the first or last things that they see or hear. This may be contributed to the natural way in
which people consolidate memory; memory formation appears to be stronger for
beginnings and ends of strings of data. Because people tend to be better memorizers of
recent data, recency bias tends to be stronger than primacy bias (Morgan & Rothoff,
2010).
Olympic judges, for example, have demonstrated a favor of competitors who
perform toward the very end of an event. This is so well known that competitors will
quarrel for the order of participation, often in attempts to perform later (Morgan &
Rothoff, 2010). In addition people are much faster on word identification tasks when they
are required to search or remember based on the first and last letter of a word (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). Lastly, Taylor (2009) discusses that for health information to be
received strongly, it should be delivered to patients in the beginning or the ending of a
message instead of somewhere in the middle.
Sequential bias, or social comparison bias, is also an example of an order effect,
for it is a biased assessment of one bit of information dependent on the information it
follows. For example, if you heard stories from informants A through Z, then you would
compare informant B's story with that of informant A's, informant C's story with that of
informant B's, informant D's story with that of informant C's, and so on, instead of
assessing each of them individually (Morgan & Rothoff, 2010; Ubel et al., 2009).
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Knowledge bias.
Although it is intuitive to assume that bias forming based on knowledge should be
labeled “knowledge bias,” scientists have instead used this term to describe a different
type of mental-state phenomenon. The term knowledge bias is another form of falsebelief reasoning, but it is the bias that observers have for other people based on what the
observers know, or think that they know, about the people. This is also known as social
perception (Pickens, 2005). As described below, knowledge bias can be demonstrated in
several different ways.
Birch (2005, 2007) explains that the curse of knowledge bias is when observers
have difficulty appreciating more ignorant perspectives: they assume that others know
what the observers know. Self-reporting also tend to reflect knowledge bias. This means
that, when asked, people will often believe that others’ knowledge and beliefs are, or
should be, similar to their own (Epley et al., 2004). Returning to Fischhoff’s experiments
(1975), for example, the participant groups who received the conclusion to the stories not
only believed that they were more likely to have already known the ending beforehand
anyway, they also believed that other people would already know it as well. The opposite
was the case for those who had to guess the endings to the stories; these participants did
not believe that they, or anyone else, would already know the ending without first being
told. The point is that each group projected their levels of knowledge onto others; they
assume everyone else knows, or should know, what they know (Gilovich, 1993).
Camerer et al. (1989) first introduced the term curse of knowledge bias in studies
of market data. Although the term was intended for the sake of economics, Birch (2005,
2007) fleshes out the theory to explain how it affects all people in daily life. She explains
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that this phenomenon begins at childhood when people exhibit the highest faults in
mental-state reasoning: inaccurately assuming that others think and know the same as
them. Unchecked, this then carries over into adulthood (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989).
Perloff (2010) describes knowledge bias as the bias people have of others’
characteristics and intensions. This is a tendency for people to stereotype others based on
limited impressions (Stewart & Payne, 2008) or context (e.g., us versus them; Anolli et
al., 2006). For example Oakes (2009) discovered that some students tend to have negative
impressions of people who are susceptible to the placebo effect. The students viewed
placebo responders as gullible, undisciplined, overindulgent, lazy, impulsive, deceptive,
or even dishonest. If these students then were to meet a placebo responder who did not fit
these characteristics however, then the bias could be potentially undone (Perloff, 2010).
Taken together, knowledge bias is the bias of people for other people. This type of
bias is closely tied to attribution bias. The difference is that attribution bias assesses the
circumstances surrounding a person in order to analyze blame, whereas knowledge bias
involves an observer assessing the circumstances surrounding other people in order to
predict people’s knowledge, intensions, attitudes, and/or behaviors (Kouabenan, 2009).
Familiarity bias.
Familiarity of something comes from exposure; this can come in the forms of
knowledge (Hall et al., 2007), experience (Klein, 2008; Klein, & Klinger, 1991;
Levesque et al., 2008; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997), or types of unconscious priming
(Kahneman, 2003; Wolfe et al., 2003). This may eventually lead to a comfort, affiliation,
or some other type of cognitive bond with the topic (Crouch & Laing, 2004). This is
termed home bias or familiarity bias. Compared to knowledge bias (when an observer's
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own knowledge of something affects their abilities to accurately assess other people's
knowledge of the same thing) familiarity bias is when an observer's own knowledge or
exposure of something affects their own reasoning.
The theories of familiarity bias are challenged by the idea that “familiarity breeds
contempt;” this phrase originated in Aesop’s fable “The Fox and the Lion”; the phrase
has since been used in reference to the disdain felt by people due to overexposure to
something (e.g., a relationship). Psychotherapist Schwartz (2010) explains however that it
may not be familiarity that causes the contempt or disdain, but instead it is the context
and dynamics that occur between the person and the activity. Negative familiarity can
come from mediocrity, the cessation of satisfaction, or other seeds of unhappiness
(Schwartz, 2010). In most other instances where certain negativities do not arise,
familiarity can have the reverse effect.
For example, Hall et al. (2007) performed experiments that tested how
superfluous knowledge could affect people's decision making capabilities. In these
studies participants had to predict the wins of a specific basketball team. The participants
were provided non-relevant information on their sports teams, such as the players' names,
and then they were asked to make their predictions. The experiment found that the
additional non-essential information increased the confidence of the participants'
predictions, but it did not increase their accuracy. The idea is that familiar information
could potentially overwrite other real-world statistical data (e.g., wins and losses); this
leads to faulty decision making (Kahneman, 2003). The experimenters termed this the
illusion of knowledge effect (Hall et al., 2007).
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In addition, Huberman (2001) performed cross-national studies of investors. He
discovered that people tend to place their money in familiar or domestic markets even if
it is detrimental to their financial return. In several instances, the investors knew what
areas would be more profitable, and yet they continued instead to place their money in
the familiar. Fox and Levav (2000) performed a similar study of investment, and they
found that participants voted that familiar scenarios were much more likely to happen
than unfamiliar scenarios. This means that they were not only attracted to familiar
circumstances, but they also believed that likelihood of occurrence was directly
proportional to their familiarity. In the Huberman (2001), Fox, and Levav (2000), studies,
familiarity gave investors the illusion of an advantage: they know more about something,
and therefore they believe that they can catch details that others may miss. They develop
an affiliation with their familiarities, and they therefore maintain a comfort with them.
This comfort guides their decisions even if it conflicts with valuable statistical data
(Cavalheiro et al., 2011; Huberman, 2001; Kahneman, 2003).
Lastly, Adaval (2003) conducted several experiments that studied how brand
names induce familiarity bias. This can occur because familiar themes of the brand names
develop into heuristics that direct judgment, or they inhibit the decision maker to acquire
any other knowledge in order to analyze other choices. Brand names also endorse the use
of heuristics by creating memories and experiences for specifically recognizable features
and traits (e.g., “golden arches” or “the copper-top”). Salience of these attributes allows
them to be recalled faster than other important details of the brand (e.g., calories per
serving or inflated prices). This newly developed brand loyalty becomes an active (or
conscious) as well as a passive (or unconscious) process (Levesque et al., 2008). For
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example when someone is pressed for time, or in other cognitive-limiting situations,
participants will prefer familiar brands. It is as if the brands have become a default choice
for the participant. These heuristics are often formed based on the way the brand is
advertised. If delivered in just the right way, the brand can become seated into a primetime cognitive position that gives it more recall priority over any other related brand.
The basic understanding of familiarity bias is that knowledge of a topic can lead
to a familiarity and a potentially affiliation or preference with it (Adaval, 2003).
According to the theory of the availability heuristic, comfort and affiliation with a topic is
the result of its convenient availability to a person's mental recall; this provides a mental
ease-of-access with the topic (Cavalheiro et al., 2011; Huberman, 2001; Kahneman,
2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). People are more content and confident when
immersed in a topic with which they feel competent, and they often feel inadequate and
awkward when forced into topic they know little about (Huberman, 2001).
Persuasion bias.
Due to the optimism, attribution, confirmation, and familiarity biases, people will
often reject information that conflicts with their beliefs. The urge to reject conflicting
new data gets stronger if it involves a subject that is important to them (Greenwald,
1980). Therefore effective methods of persuasion are necessary in order to maneuver
around this. Persuasion bias explains mental heuristics that are formed due to outside
influences. People can become persuaded due to their inability to recognize certain
persuasion techniques. The main objective of these bias forming strategies is to use
communication in order to influence and lead others' opinions. For example, using
communication to induce fear is called “fear appeals,” and they are often used in health
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education (Das et al., 2003; DeSteno et al., 2004). There are four primary methods of
effective persuasion bias: first-person anecdotes, a well-sourced persuader, emotionally
charged words, and tactical repetition of persuasion.
Anecdotes (Ubel, 2002, 2008), also termed expert interviews or testimonials
(Haskins et al., 2010), are highly effective methods of persuasion bias. This is because
the act of simply reciting statistics can confuse and induce stressful and misguided
decisions in listeners (Nelson, Han, Fagerlin, Stefanek, & Ubel, 2007). Ubel (2008) found
that people want to hear facts from someone who has been in similar situations. This
presents problems however. Testimonials and first-person witness accounts are plagued
with bias, and biases can influence intension and memory (Greenwald, 1980). It is a
fallacy that someone else's experiences and opinions will be the same as yours. People
experience things in different ways; therefore first-person testimonials only provide
certain perspectives. This also assumes that the anecdotes are from people who are
delivering them honestly. It is for these reasons that many professionals often discourage
the serious considerations of anecdotes (Ubel, 2002, 2008). Regardless of this, they are
still powerful suggestors, and therefore are very influential when used in persuasion.
How people perceive the source of the persuasion can influence whether or not it
is effective. For example, persuasion bias also works well when it is delivered from
multiple sources at a time (DeMarzo et al., 2003) such as from friends, the media, or
authority figures (Anolli et al., 2006; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Gilovich, 1993;
Groeling, 2008; Rankin-Box, 2006). The same effect can also be reached by a single
person who is perceived as having several sources of knowledge. Regardless of the
accuracy of their information, some of the most influential persuaders are those who are
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perceived as well sourced and connected (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; DeMarzo et al.,
2003), or if they are perceived as being in positions of knowing and power (Benedetti,
2002). Health psychologists have recognized that people are more prone to altering
unhealthy behaviors if information is delivered to them by an expert and credible
physician than by other outlets (Benedetti, 2002; Taylor, 2009). This idea is similar to a
behavioral-modification technique called modeling, where people are influenced by
others’ ideas and behaviors and therefore these behaviors are adopted and mimicked
(Taylor, 2009).
Once persuaders convince others that they are well-sourced, they then have to
tailor how they choose to deliver their persuasion. The most effective way to do this is to
give emotional significance to the information (Cavalheiro et al., 2011; DeSteno et al.,
2004; Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Therefore the wording that is used
to describe a topic, such as romantic or threatening, can affect the way that it is perceived
or remembered (Kahneman, 2003; Taylor, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Words
that encourage or resonate with specific moods or emotions are known as charged words.
Harris and Pashler (2004) conducted studies to evaluate negative emotionally charged
words, and they found that these initially attract attention to stimuli. Certain threatening
or taboo words, especially those related to health and survival, seem to cause visceral
reactions in people that add significance to a concept or memory into a person's mind.
These emotionally-driven reactions cause high salience to be attached to a memory or
idea (Aquino & Arnell, 2007; Anolli et al., 2006; Benedetti, 2002; Cavalheiro et al.,
2011; DeSteno et al., 2004; Kahneman, 2003; Nairne et al., 2009; Taylor, 2009; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974).
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After the wording has been selected, persuasion is more effective if it is delivered
continuously. This is because persuasion bias is the most effective when data is repeated;
this is also known as repetition priming (Berry et al., 2006). There are three potential
explanations for this, and they all have to do with the availability of memory (DeMarzo et
al., 2003; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989). The first explanation is salience; this means that
something can be confused as more valid if it is recalled more easily (Kahneman, 2003;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Another explanation goes back to familiarity, which means
that repeating a topic also induces familiarity with it; as explained previously, familiar
topics will then merit higher cognitive priority than unfamiliar topics. The last
explanation has to do with limited memory; this means that repetition can be confused
with accuracy due to our limited memory processes and storage (DeMarzo et al., 2003).
All of this suggests a ceiling effect for memory, and the concepts are basically the
cognitive equivalent of picking a name out of a hat: if someone cheats and places a name
in the hat more than any of the other names, then that name is more likely to be selected.
In addition to repetition, the perceivers’ inability to account for the repetitions is
also necessary for persuasion bias. This means that if people are aware of how many
times they have been exposed to an argument, or they can remember each exposure, then
they are less likely to be persuaded. However if people are distracted or otherwise unable
to detect the repetitions of a persuader, then they are more likely to be persuaded
(Levesque et al., 2008). To truly understand how this works, it is best to analyze the
differences between implicit and explicit memories. Implicit memories are derived from
previous experiences which the person is sometimes unable to remember; these
experiences provide primed information that affects decision-making and behavior

43
(Wolfe et al., 2003). Explicit memories are derived from previous experiences which the
person is able to remember; these memories may then be traced to their source
experiences. Therefore implicit memories are more prone to persuasion than explicit
memories.
Klein et al. (2002) argue that the same can be said for semantic and episodic
memories. They claim that episodic memories, retrieved from the right frontal cortical
regions of the brain, are recalled from memorable experiences, but semantic memories,
received from the left frontal cortical regions of the brain, are recalled by general
summary representations that can be independent of memorable experiences. Regardless,
all of these types are produced by experience, and they can affect behavior. They are then
categorized based on whether they are explicitly or implicitly stored and recovered
(tethered or untethered) to their origins or source experiences (Berry et al., 2006; Gilbert
& Osborne, 1989; Levesque et al., 2008; Wolfe et al., 2003).
Taking all of this together, effective persuasion bias does not only rely on
repetition, but it also capitalizes on the stealth of that repetition (DeMarzo et al., 2003).
This is when people, who are communicating through social networks, are unable to
account for the repeating information. The structure of the network therefore encourages
social influence (DeSteno et al., 2004; Corazzini et al., 2010). Returning to the name-outof-a-hat metaphor: although cheating and placing a name into a hat more than once
increases the chances of that name getting selected, dependence on everyone else's
ignorance of this is vital for the plan's success.
The ultimate objective of persuasion bias is to instill bias in people through
intentional, persistent, and convincing exposure. Wood (2000) discusses that the

44
objective may not be to change the attitude of something, but rather to change the
definition or meaning of it. This is because the attitude should change simultaneously
with the meaning. The most successful types of persuasion techniques are those that
cause people to change their minds without admitting any change had ever occurred. If
undetected, persuasion bias will eventually breed familiarity bias in the group of people
who are targeted (Greenwald, 1980). It is often used in propaganda to distort perceptions
of risks in order to promote agendas hidden or known. The media is often cited as using
persuasion bias as an effective tool for propaganda, censorship, political spin, or when
they are trying to endorse a position that is not popular or intuitive to the population
(Anolli et al., 2006; DeSteno et al., 2004; Gilovich, 1993; Greenwald, 1980; Groeling,
2008; Rankin-Box, 2006). People tend to rarely follow up and fact check what they
receive from others. As a result, many people will only believe information based on how
it is presented to them (DeSteno et al., 2004; Rankin-Box, 2006). It is therefore important
to consider the agendas of informants; it is also important to consider how delivery of
your information will affect those who you are trying to inform (DeMarzo et al., 2003).
Bias Mitigation
This final section of biases will briefly discuss methods that attempt to minimize
or undo bias. Senay and Kaphingst (2009) argue that mitigating bias leads to more
accurate risk perceptions, and therefore it assists in better risk assessment. This tends to
be the case not only for specific risk assessment scenarios (e.g., assessing risk of highthreat activities) but also for tangential decision-making circumstances (e.g., evaluating
one’s general state of health).
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Inadequate predictions and judgment based on bias can be reduced when
decision-makers are provided real-world data (Kahneman, 2003). Even the simplest
statistical models have encouraged medical patients to make sounder decisions.
According to Hall et al. (2007), impairing decision-makers’ prior knowledge may
sometimes be in their best interest. If situations elicit familiar sources (or heuristics) of
knowledge, then the individuals will assess the scenario based on the content of those
heuristics (based on their current familiarities). Providing mitigation, like contextual
decision aids, allows the decision-makers to rely on other, potentially more accurate,
types of data sets (Hall et al., 2007; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).
“Decision aids are educational materials, informed by decision analysis, that
structure information in a way that makes patients aware of the tradeoffs inherent in their
treatment choices” (Ubel, 2008). Decision aides are also known as a type of contextual
information (Ubel et al., 2009), reference class forecasting (Flyvbjerg, 2008), or prior
probability base-rate frequency information (Lin, Lin, & Raghubir, 2003; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). They are basically ways of presenting real-world information in an
easy to understand way; they then assist people in making the best possible decisions.
This is because they help to temporarily suspend biases by providing a real-world driven
standard of comparison. Decision aids can be represented in many different ways, but the
most effective are graphical representations of comparisons, like pictographs. These are
effective against most types of biases as well as sources of bias. For example, reference
class comparisons are effective tools against optimism and organizer bias. Pictorial
information is powerful in engaging attention (Öhman et al., 2001), and it has also been
shown to override order effects and other biases that are influenced by first-person
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testimonials (Ubel, 2008; Ubel et al., 2009). Therefore decision aids, although developed
for specific bias-driven fallacies, have been found to mitigate most human biases
(Flyvbjerg, 2008; Ubel, 2008; Ubel et al., 2009).
Ubel (2002, 2008), however, also argues that, instead of interpreted factually,
decision aids may lead people into making decisions based on how the aids are
interpreted. They may even lead to systematic irrational decisions under certain
circumstances (Ubel, 2002). Decision aids that are full of statistics and jargon can
confuse people. They will either cause the person to disengage due to boredom, or they
may induce extra stress (Taylor, 2009). In both cases this will then impair decision
making and cause default-driven biases to run unchecked. To complicate things further,
some developers of decision aids may attempt to change or withhold factual information
under the noble intent of minimizing confusion, but this can be considered unethical. In
addition, even if all of the information is present in the decision aids, and they are
understood, then they can still be misleading (Nelson et al., 2007). For example the
presence of too many side effects can deter patients from choosing to take a medication
that will save their lives. In this case decision aids may help the person to understand
some aspects too well, so that other equally important aspects are not as clear. In
addition, decision aids may be used as a persuasion technique, by highlighting certain
aspects and downplaying others, in order to influence decision making. These are
examples that, if performed incorrectly, could cause decision aids to induce bias rather
than mitigate it (Ubel, 2002, 2008).
In addition to decision aids, corrective (or effortful) thinking is also deployed in
an attempt to reduce bias (Gilbert, & Osborne, 1989; Kahneman, 2003; Senay &
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Kaphingst, 2009). Stewart and Payne (2008) performed three experiments in order to
reduce racial stereotyping in participants. They discovered that the lack of racial
stereotyping was much more automatic in participants that first engaged in counterstereotyping thinking, a technique they call implementation intention, prior to the
exercises. It was argued by Stewart and Payne (2008) however that this strategy does not
necessarily mitigate biases, but instead it encourages the development of new biases that
replace the existing ones.
Perception of Risk
If perception is the process by which organisms interpret and organize sensation
to produce a meaningful experience of the world (Pickens, 2005), then perception of risk
is how organisms interpret sensory data as it relates to threat or danger. This relies on the
information available, the context of the risk, and the individual who is assessing (Hirsch
& Baxter, 2010; Kahneman, 2003). Nairne et al. (2009) passed participants through two
scenarios to test memory of a list of objects. One scenario prompted participants to
memorize lists in survival-relevant scenarios (e.g., food gathering for a tribe), and the
other scenario prompted participants to memorize the list in survival non-relevant
scenarios (e.g., scavenger hunt). Although the lists were the same, memorization was
better for those in the survival scenario. Öhman et al. (2001) discovered that certain
threats, primarily the instinctual ones, are evolutionarily relevant. Some of the threats
explored were snakes, spiders, and angry faces. Other threats, however, must be learned
(Das et al., 2003), such as the biological effects of radiation. Regardless, fear-relevant
threats are detected much quicker, and far better, than any other type of stimulus. This
speed and proficiency are increased in phobics or other people who have heightened
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sensitivity for specific stimuli (Das et al., 2003; Klein & Harris, 2009; Öhman et al.,
2001; Senay & Kaphingst, 2009; Sharp et al., 2012).
Risk Assessment
The perception of safety ultimately determines the success or failure of most
commercial activities. Within the organizations, there is a significant amount of overlap
between the definitions of safety culture and safety climate. Martinussen and Hunter
(2009) studied human factors and safety. Based on their analysis of practiced norms, they
argue that a safety culture is usually defined as a set of shared norms, values, and
perceptual constructs (e.g., the attitude of safety), and a safety climate is defined as
manifestations and measurable aspects of those (e.g., the practice of safety). In both
cases, active involvement is required from all levels of the organization, as well as from
those affected by the organization, if safe practices are to be successfully implemented
(Martinussen & Hunter, 2009). Ball (2002) found that there are several ways that
organizational climates influence the perception of risk and how individual factors
contribute to this. According to his findings, risk management consists of three parallel
and intertwined processes: science-based risk assessments, stakeholder involvement, and
risk management decision making. Science-based risk assessment comes from statistical
analyses and assessment of perceived risks, stakeholder analysis involves understanding
how those risks are interpreted by people who participate, and risk management decision
making comes from the successful interaction of them all (Ball, 2002).
Identifying the appropriate risk management strategy seems to be the most
difficult task. Ball (2002) argues that this stems from misunderstandings between the
safety and risk analysis specialists (e.g., NASA and OSHA) and those with which the risk
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exists, like spaceflight participants (Ball, 2002). For example, some safety
implementations from safety experts, such as procedures or extra equipment, may not be
completely understood by lay people. This then may cause confusion or animosity to
these new changes by participants or a workforce; this may then lead people to
completely disregard the safety implementations. Therefore the safety experts have to
discover ways to mitigate risk as well as configure methods that will be taken seriously
once they are introduced to the people who must practice them.
Several structured and professional methods of decision making have been
proposed and used within organizations. Examples are the Multi-Attribute Utility
Analysis, the Decision Analysis (Klein & Klinger, 1991), and the procedures offered by
the INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook (Haskins et al., 2010). Tables 4 and 5
display the inputs and outputs that INCOSE offers of each. According to Haskins et al.
(2010), the purpose of the systems engineering decision making processes is to select the
best possible action out of several options. A successful way to approach a decision is to
define choices, analyze the decision information, and then track the decision you have
made.
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Table 4. Inputs and Outputs of the Decision Management Process (Haskins et al., 2010)
Controls
-Applicable Law and Regulations
-Industry Standards
-Agreements
-Project Procedures and
Standards
-Project Directives

˅
Activities

Inputs
-Decision Situation

˃

-Plan and Define Decisions
-Analyze the Decision
Information
-Track the Decision

Outputs
˂

-Decision Management
Strategy
-Decision Report

˄
Enablers
-Organization/Enterprise
Policies, Procedures, and
Standards
- Organization/Enterprise
Infrastructure
-Project Infrastructure

Also according to Haskins et al. (2010), the purpose of the systems engineering
risk management processes is to establish a continuous and vigilant system for risk
identification and assessment. In order to do this you have to plan your risk management
system, define risks, define acceptable levels of each risk, analyze the risks in different
scenarios, treat the risks that have high-unacceptable levels, monitor your risks, and
follow-up on your program often.
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Table 5. Inputs and Outputs of the Risk Management Process (Haskins et al., 2010)
Controls
-Applicable Law and Regulations
-Industry Standards
-Agreements
-Project Procedures and Standards
-Project Directives

˅
Activities

Inputs

-Candidate Risks and
Opportunities

˃

-Plan Risk Management
-Manage the Risk Profile
-Analyze Risks
-Treat Risks
-Monitor Risks
-Evaluate the Risk Management
Process

Outputs
-Risk Strategy

˂ -Risk Profile

-Risk Report

˄
Enablers
-Organization/Enterprise Policies,
Procedures, and Standards
- Organization/Enterprise
Infrastructure
-Project Infrastructure

Normal outcomes are delivered in the form of reports, profiles, and strategies like
the risk matrix. Figure 1 is an example of a risk matrix. Although several versions have
been developed, the point of a risk matrix is to categorize and compare the likelihood of a
risk with its severity, and to portray it in an easy to read format (Haskins et al., 2010).
High

Consequences

High
Risk

Low

Med.
Risk

Low
Risk
Low

Likelihood

High

Figure 1. Risk Matrix (Haskins et al., 2010)
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These professional decision making and risk assessment protocols are not always
practiced. The models often become inadequate in certain real-world situations. This is
because of time constraints and improperly defined factors (Cavalheiro et al., 2011;
Klein, 2008; Klein & Klinger, 1991; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Furthermore, paying
customers of a recreational activity, like commercial spaceflight, may not be expected to
evaluate the risks using those procedures. Therefore organizations have to be responsible
for two additional tasks. The first task is to perform risk assessment procedures for the
customers. The second task is to understand how the average person assesses risk, so that
the organization can then provide special ways of delivering information that customers
can understand. This is specifically important when developing information issuing
methods like informed consent documents or training programs (Turner et al., 2008).
As seen in everyday tasks, as well as professional activities (e.g., health care,
military operations, and disaster response), people tend to use a method called
naturalistic, or recognition-primed, decision making (Klein & Klinger, 1991; Klein, 2008;
Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). This involves on-the-spot decision making and risk assessment
based on one's prior knowledge and experience. As discussed earlier, anchoring and
adjustment bias is a version of recognition-primed decision making, and therefore it can
predispose people to making the wrong decisions if previous experiences led to
misperceptions. The more these decisions are used the more they will continue to be used
even if they are derived from faulty input or practice: practice makes permanent, not
perfect. Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) developed several theories in order to provide the
most modern and informative model of naturalistic decision-making. Their studies
support the theory that people in real-world situations use specific intuitive strategies
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when making decisions. They termed this set of techniques the Reduction, Assumptionbased reasoning, Weighting pros and cons, Forestalling, and Suppression (R.A.W.F.S.)
heuristic. Each method covered under this strategy tackles specific ways of decisionmaking under uncertainty. Table 6 pairs the strategies with the situations that can be
encountered. Reduction involves reducing uncertainty by collecting additional
information, seeking advice, and utilizing standard operating procedures. Assumptionbased reasoning involves replacing gaps in hard knowledge with best guesses. Weighting
pros and cons involves making a list of advantages and drawbacks in order to ascertain
which options are superior. Forestalling involves preparation and planning for worst-case
scenarios. Lastly, suppressing uncertainties involve ignoring uncertainties and taking
risks in spite of them (Klein, 2008; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).
Table 6. R.A.W.F.S. Strategies and Situations (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997)
Strategies
Reduction
Assumption based-reasoning
Weighing pros and cons
Forestalling (back-up)
Suppression (back-up)

Situations
Inadequate understanding
Incomplete information/reasoning
Conflict among alternatives
Most used for all forms of uncertainty
Least used for all forms of uncertainty

According to Öhman et al. (2001), risk is also assessed along the inside/outside,
stimulus-driven/goal driven, processes mentioned before. The stimulus-driven process
involves a passive processing that is fast and automatic. It is an ongoing cognitive
function that reacts when threatening stimuli are instinctual such as snakes or snake-like
objects. Goal-driven processes involve an active processing that is slower and more
deliberate. They become engaged when higher mental effort takes place in order to
identify threats, and it is often recruited for non-instinctual threats. Examples of these
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non-instinctual threats are potential risks like the biological effects of radiation; these
things may not be intuitive or obvious dangers. Explained in another way, heuristic,
stimulus-driven, processes are activated by simple perception, and systematic, goaldriven, processes are activated by attentional scanning (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994;
Öhman et al., 2001).
Naturalistic decision making is an example of the fact that, despite the
intervention of science, risk management is ultimately defined by the value systems of
those who actually practice it (Ball, 2002). Risks also occur due to situations being
interpreted in several different ways based on the perspectives of the individuals
(Kouabenan, 2009). Humans’ lack of adherence to risk assessment strategies is primarily
due to misunderstandings between the safety system designers and human nature. These
misunderstandings are usually due to miscommunication (Senay & Kaphingst, 2009).
The safety engineers, although very educated in their specialty, fail to include human
psychology-centered ways of delivering advice (Ball, 2002).
In addition to inadequate information transfer, perceptions of risk are dependent
on upon social, psychological, emotional, political, and cultural factors (Anolli et al.,
2006; Cavalheiro et al., 2011; DeSteno et al., 2004). Information gathered by Kouabenan
(2009) suggests that the cultures of certain countries are more accepting of risks, like
Asian and African countries, and individuals may even sometimes seek out dangers in
order to define themselves as brave or capable of overcoming obstacles. Sharp et al.
(2012) report that similar phenomena can be found domestically as well in the United
States. Certain beliefs can encourage or discourage risk, and some people will try to gain
control of risks by relying on superstitious, religious, spiritual, or magical practices. It is

55
beneficial to recognize these influences, their sources, and how they behave (Kouabenan,
2009).
Taylor (2009) discusses that the perception of risk is ultimately determined by
three things: general health values, beliefs about personal vulnerability to a risk, and the
beliefs about the consequences of the risk. The first factor, general health values, is
basically the health attitude that someone holds; some people are more concerned about
their health and mortality than others. The other two factors, vulnerability to risk and
belief about consequences, basically define how likely people believe that the risk will
affect them as well as how bad things will be if it does. Many people will make tradeoffs,
meaning that they will tolerate a certain amount of risk if there are positive tradeoffs.
Examples of these are habits such as smoking or other forms of substance abuse, or they
come in the form of personal enjoyment like extreme sports (Taylor, 2009, pg. 57).
Familiarity and the Leniency of Risk.
Hirsch and Baxter (2010) reported that Caucasian males tend to be, on average,
less concerned with the hazards and risks associated with things that are familiar. In
addition to young people, men, and risk-takers, Crouch and Laing (2004) also discovered
that the majority of people who are interested in some high-risk activities, like space
travel, are professionals and educated (e.g., degree-seekers and college graduates). One of
the greatest concerns for those who do not wish to participate in space travel, nonprofessionals or non-high school graduates, was the danger involved. The perception of
danger was a greater concern for them than the financial price to participate. What this
means is that professionals and the educated were much more lenient of the risks of space
travel than non-professionals and the less educated (Crouch & Laing, 2004).
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Although the benefits of knowledge and familiarity are obvious, they can also
contaminate perception under certain circumstances (Gilovich, 1993; Birch & Bloom,
2007). Knowledge about a topic does not always insure truth about it. It is plagued by the
reliability of sources, possible partial disclosures, and misunderstandings. If knowledge is
then filtered through context, then even the most pragmatic information may be
interpreted in several different ways (Benedetti, 2002; Hirsch & Baxter, 2010;
Kahneman, 2003; Nelson et al., 2007; Stewart & Payne, 2008).
There is evidence that experts not only demonstrate observable differences
between knowledge of hazards and the risks associated with them (Hirsch & Baxter,
2010), but they can also become over-assured in their biased assessments of risk within
their specialties (Ball, 2002; Charness & Gneezy, 2003; Kouabenan, 2009). Hall et al.
(2007) support the hypothesis that increases in knowledge and familiarity have
tendencies to also increase confidence instead of accuracy (Cavalheiro et al., 2011). This
is sometimes called the “illusion of knowledge” effect, and it states that the presence of
knowledge can sometimes impair sound decision making (Hall et al., 2007). This can be
seen in experts across multiple fields (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Birch and Bloom
(2007), Gilovich, (1993) and Klein and Harris (2009) found that this reasoning further
cements biases; this means that a bias is far more difficult to extinguish if it is
accompanied by excuses, ad hoc explanations, or other rationale provided for
justification. Because experts may become more confident about their proficiencies than
novices however, their biases are often harder to mitigate (Ball, 2002; Klein et al., 2006).
While Huberman (2001), Fox, and Levav (2000) demonstrated that familiarity
enforces preference and increased perceived likelihood of occurrence, Halpern-Felsher et
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al. (2001) found that increased familiarity of an activity also led to a lesser concern of the
risks associated with it. They found that participants who have engaged in a high-risk
activity were less likely to anticipate negative outcomes from it. The opposite was true
for participants who had never engaged in the high-risk activity; these participants
thought that negative outcomes were much more likely to occur.
Knowledge is further complicated due to the phenomenon known as skill decay.
This occurs when a skill is deteriorated or lost due to lack of use. Certain skills fade away
more quickly than others. For example, motor skills, also known in the US military as
muscle memory, can be retained much longer than cognitive skills like rudimentary
memory. The main problem with skill decay is that many professionals are unaware, or
unlikely to admit, that they have lost the skill. This means that they are not as keen as
they once were regarding their training and knowledge, but they mistakenly believe that
they are (Wisher et al., 1991).
Professionals know the risks of their specialties better than anyone else, although
they eventually disassociate the same level of danger to these risks than those who are
unfamiliar with the field (Huberman, 2001; Kahneman, 2003; Kouabenan, 2009). In
contrast, people with little experience or exposure in an activity may demonstrate greater
discomfort with the potential risks, and they therefore highly overestimate the levels of
danger (Hirsch & Baxter, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Professionals however
may perceive risk in different ways. Due to national, state, and organizational safety
standards, the workplace is the safest it has ever been; this continued environment of
safety can sometimes reduce the perception of risk. Although specialists are educated to
understand their threats, some of the real dangers are rarely ever encountered. Harris and
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Pashler’s (2004) studies helped support the idea that the perception of threatening stimuli
can deteriorate over time, and it can sometimes eventually dwindle to nothing. Klein and
Harris (2009) discovered that threatening messages could instead be interpreted
defensively, and therefore the message of threat would be completely and aggressively
ignored. This could mean that, although the experience of an accident can forever cement
a threat into a person’s mind, the impact of simply discussing accidents may become
overridden by contradicting experience or personal attitude. Eventually the concern of
risks can become nonexistent (Harris & Pashler, 2004).
For some, risk-taking is just another part of the job. For this reason, safety
oversights tend to occur due to misunderstandings of risks by novices or the disregard of
risks by experts (Kouabenan, 2009). Some people become comfortable with something to
the point of complacency. This can result in a tolerance of shortcomings like risks
(Adaval, 2003; Cavalheiro et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
This maybe unrelated however to known hazardous attitudes, such as machismo, antiauthoritarianism, invulnerability, impulsivity, and resignation. Instead a paradox seems to
emerge: although some experts may be more aware of the serious dangers of their
professional situations (e.g., radiation, chemical toxicity, excessive noise, etc.) they can
also exhibit certain types of indifference or non-concern for them (Ball, 2002).
To bring together everything that has been discussed so far, the more information
attained about a topic may engender an affiliation to that topic. This familiarity can then
distort the perception of risk due to over-confidence, ignorance of limitations,
experience-driven misperceptions, inappropriate use of knowledge or specialties, or
general complacency. Biased judgments are not necessarily bad judgments however, but
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greater knowledge does not always lead to the most optimum decisions. Extraneous
information, if it is perceived as relevant by the decision maker, may distort judgments
rather than help them (Adaval, 2003; Charness & Gneezy, 2003; Fehr & Tyran, 2008;
Gilovich, 1993; Kahneman, 2003). When people have reasoned their way into thinking
that something is not a threat then it is difficult to convince them of otherwise. Kos and
Clarke (2001) say, “The illusion that people do not need to protect themselves from
something that is not going to happen anyway may also adversely affect campaigns
aimed at increasing precautionary behavior.”
The Present Study and Hypotheses
In order to properly measure and experiment with biases, several theories need to
be utilized. According to Michie and Prestwich (2010) a theory “provides a common
description of what is known within an organizing system.” It is a set of definitions and
ideas that attempt to explain and predict interactions between variables. Rather than
simply used as a loose framework, the theories must be applied functionally in order to
identify or induce the specific types of biases that are being studied (Michie & Prestwich,
2010). Currently, more studies are needed in bias research. However scientists, like those
discussed in this study, have already discovered a great deal of information on these types
of mental phenomena.
The material presented in this report thus far demonstrates that theories have been
reached about how biases are formed, how they affect decisions, and how they are
mitigated. Also discussed was how heuristics, biases, and other types of automatic
thinking can affect decision making and risk assessment. More studies are needed,
however, that examine the influences of the interactions or conflicts between two or more
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different, and sometimes conflicting, biases (especially familiarity and persuasion bias)
on risk assessment (Kahneman, 2003). This is because some biases may be the
representations of different underlying mental phenomena. As was already discussed, for
example, knowledge bias, confirmation bias, and attribution bias may be the behavioral
offspring of egocentrism, cognitive conservatism, and beneffectance respectively.
Another example is the evolution of cognitive dissonance theory. Greenwald and
Ronis (1978) discuss how the theory of cognitive dissonance has changed over time. It
was once thought that it resulted from cognitive conservatism, but the theory was later
changed so that it derived from egocentrism and self-esteem maintenance. They go on to
discuss how the original theories may have instead been correct, and that these basic
changes in perceived origin greatly reshape the overall theory and its future directions.
This demonstrates that it is not just the biases themselves that are important to theorists,
but also an understanding of the underlying mental origins of the biases.
In order to measure two different biases, as well as their interactions, definable
thresholds have to be imposed. Appropriate functional terms must then be provided for
each. As discussed earlier, external stimulus-driven versus internal goal-driven behaviors
are examined in studies of cognition and decision making. The names that are used for
them however are different depending on the phenomena being investigated. (Engel et
al., 2001; Klein et al., 2002; Öhman et al., 2001) In this study of biases, the term
persuasion bias (PB) represented the external stimulus-driven influence (based on fear
appeals), and the term familiarity bias (FB) represented the internal goal-driven influence
(based on familiarity). PB and FB were pitted against each in order to measure which bias
was the strongest under certain threat conditions.
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To apply this practically, PB was presented in a way that people would normally
encounter it, such as in informed consent documents and brochures encountered in the
decision-making process of a high-risk activity. FB was measured by assessing
participants’ familiarity of elements surrounding the activity. For this study, commercial
space travel was the high-risk activity that was introduced. Space tourism is still new and
has attracted international interest. The nature of the activity demands an assessment of
risks as well as the public’s understanding of these risks; the newness of the topic makes
it ripe for this type of investigation. The main materials that were discussed were
radiation, LEO, and space travel. To measure independent variables, each participant’s
familiarity level of the topic was identified by the results of a modest assessment test, and
PB was induced with the help some of the most effective types of persuasion strategies.
To measure the dependent variable, perception of risk, opinion scores of participants
were collected regarding radiation limitation recommendations. Since the data were
opinions and few in number, non-parametric procedures were used to assess the results.
Independent Variables
This study attempted to analyze two very specific types of biases. This is
somewhat a complicated goal, because there are often overlaps between biases. For
example, cognitive dissonance is a mental phenomenon that occurs when people perceive
inconsistencies within their adopted attitudes and/or behaviors. Because this leads to
discomfort, people will often use mental strategies in order to rectify these
inconsistencies (Greenwald & Ronis, 1978; Wood, 2000). Strategies may include:
relinquishing responsibility for an act or decision (attribution bias), minimizing the
importance of an uncomfortable issue (optimism bias), recognizing new information that

62
is consistent with an attitude or behavior (confirmation bias), or denying, distorting, or
selectively forgetting information (selective perception and hindsight bias). It therefore
appears that the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance may involve at least four different
types of cognitive biases (Das et al., 2003; Pickens, 2005; Wood, 2000). Similarly,
persuasion bias may eventually become familiarity bias. This is because FB develops
from experience and exposure. This could include the influence and persuasion that
people receive over time. Because of this, methods were developed for this experiment in
order to mitigate certain types of biases while encouraging others.
Familiarity bias.
Two methods were used to determine familiarity of the material: a brief 12
question assessment test of radiation, LEO, and space travel, and a background
demographics questionnaire to assess education and experience. Because types of
information can vary between different radiation research organizations, the questions for
the assessment test were selected based on data universally agreed upon among
researchers across the field. Refer to Appendix A for an overview of the material. In an
attempt to guard against any floor or ceiling effects, the questions were first administered
to ten test participants. These participants answered the questions to the best of their
knowledge, and then they rated the difficulty of each question. Twelve questions were
selected from the pool based on the results. These included three high-difficulty
questions, three low-difficulty questions, and six average-difficulty questions.
It is in the interest of this study to divide the participants into a high-familiarity
field and a low-familiarity field in order to appropriately define a threshold for
measurement. Therefore the scores of the assessment test were polarized so that there
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were no in-between groups. The top and bottom 30% of each threat condition were used
as high FB and low FB respectfully.
It is important to mention that, although knowledge was being measured to detect
the level of bias, knowledge bias was not being measured. Instead this study proposes
that a participant's prior knowledge of a topic also increases his/her familiarity with it.
Therefore, for the sake of the study, the operational definition of familiarity bias is bias
that people have toward a topic based on their exposure to it (e.g., experience, education,
or other exposures).
All efforts to minimize FB were made; this is because the hypotheses argue that
FB is much more powerful than PB due to internalized motivation and self-regulation.
(Deci & Ryan, 2000; Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Levesque et al.,
2008; Taylor, 2009). In addition, Wood (2000) discusses that persuasion-oriented
information is often met critically and defensively when it is a topic of familiarity to the
person. This means that the bias that is attempted to be persuaded may run into conflict
when it encounters a related bias that has already been adopted by an individual.
Persuasion bias.
Contrary to FB, PB was endorsed by using some of the most effective persuasion
techniques. Studies of literature reveal that these techniques involve first-person
anecdotes, well-sourced persuaders, emotionally charged words, and tactical repetitions
of persuasion. Each technique was used to induce or mitigate fear appeals.
For anecdotes, quotes from U.S. astronauts were provided. Quotes from each
astronaut were selected based on the specific type of persuasion that was being
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encouraged. For example, conditions provided negative, but relevant, statements from a
deceased astronaut and positive, but relevant, statements from a living astronaut.
A well-learned and well-sourced position was established by listing and quoting
from popularly cited sources of space and space radiation research such as the National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measures, the International Commission on
Radiation Protection, the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council, and
NASA. Although there are conflicts between agencies about certain aspects of radiation,
LEO, and space travel, only information universally agreed upon across all sources were
used. The same raw information that was used, although colored with persuasion, was
provided across all conditions.
A third of the participants received questionnaires with wording that attempted to
persuade them that the radiation environment in LEO is threatening and dangerous
(HighThreat), another third of the participants received questionnaires with wording that
attempted to persuade them that the radiation environment in LEO is safe and not
dangerous (LowThreat), and the final third of the participants received questionnaires that
attempt to provide no persuasion at all (NoPersuade). The groups under the NoPersuade
condition were considered the control group of the persuasion bias variable; these groups
received no intentional persuasion, but instead they received neutral or contextual
information (a decision aid strategy) in order to mitigate bias. Each type of persuasion
strategy that was used was tailored to induce the theme of radiation (threatening, nonthreatening, or neutral) in the questionnaire packet.
Each method was implanted strategically and intermittently throughout the
questionnaire in order to establish repetition. Participants in persuasion conditions
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experienced persuasion throughout the experiment, from start to finish, so that order
effects did not confound. Strategies were used to endorse the best types of PB as possible.
The ultimate goal was to block prior biases from entering the experiment while
encouraging persuasion bias influence through influential techniques. The point was that
familiarity bias will maintain its influence with participants even when it is repressed and
contended against the most effective persuasion strategies.
Lastly, people are more likely to be cognizant of the threats of an activity if they
are, or imagine they are, actually participating in it (Nairne et al., 2009). In order to
fabricate this through a questionnaire, the participants were presented an example of a
waiver that they would encounter before traveling to space. These waivers contained
traces of persuasion bias, and they placed the participants in a position to realistically
think about the risky activity as well as how it may have affected them. Charged words
were carefully selected and added to the waiver’s contents in order to influence the
participants. According to theories of charged words, these would attract the attention of
the participants and therefore provide an influence even if the sections were briefly
scanned by the readers (Aquino & Arnell, 2007). The participants were encouraged to
read the waiver as if they had to later make a choice on whether or not to sign it.
Dependent Variables
This study measured the preference and perception of risk of the activity
(commercial space travel), and how they are affected by the interactions of familiarity
and persuasion bias. In the end participants were asked to provide their personal opinions
of radiation risk by declaring their preference of suggested radiation limits for space
travelers. This was collected through two questions; both questions were selected based
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on two important concerns regarding the study of radiation on human tissues: level of
radiation dosage and length of exposure (NCRP, 2000). According to Kos and Clarke
(2001) the length of time that occurs between the start of a risky activity (e.g., length of
time in radiation) and the supposed beginning of a negative consequence that can occur
from it (e.g., cancer) is known as perceived delay of onset. The first question provided
participants with a set length of time (one year) and it asked them about the maximum
amount of radiation that they would safely allow for one person during that time. The
second question provided the participants with a set level of radiation (0.3 sieverts per
year) and it asked them about the maximum amount of days that they would safely allow
for one person under that exposure. The questions basically assessed the perceived risk of
radiation from two perspectives: regarding time and regarding quantity.
Selecting a higher number of days exposed or higher dosages of radiation
reflected participants who had a high leniency of risk (HLR), for it demonstrated that
they were not as concerned with the dangers of radiation. Selecting a lower number of
days exposed or lower dosages of radiation reflected participants who had a low leniency
of risk (LLR), for it demonstrated that they were concerned with the dangers of radiation.
Table 7 displays the high limits/high leniency and low limits/low leniency relationships.
Table 8 displays the breakdown of the experimental conditions.
Table 7. LLR versus HCR
LLR
=
Low Leniency of
Risks

Low Rad
Limits
Rad Dose/Days
Participants choose to impose low limits
of exposure; are concerned for they are
attempting to minimize radiation.

HLR
= High Leniency of
Risks

High Rad
Limits
Rad Dose/Days
Participants choose to impose high limits
of exposure; are not concerned for they
are not attempting to minimize radiation.
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In addition, preferences were collected by four questions meant to gauge the
participants’ preference of various aspects of space travel. The first question asked the
participants to state their enthusiasm of space travel, the second question asked them the
likelihood of them participating in travel to space, the third question asked them the
likelihood of them participating in travel to LEO, and the last question asked them what
they thought about the idea of humans in outer space. Collectively these questions would
represent the participants’ overall preference of the activity.
Table 8. Experimental Conditions (Interactions of Independent Variables)
High threat persuasion

High familiarity

Low threat persuasion

No persuasion

High threat persuasion

Low familiarity

Low threat persuasion

No persuasion

Because two levels of the threat I.V. were intended to encourage bias towards
extremes (very threatening or non-threatening), an appropriate scale was needed that can
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detect fine changes between the polarized opinions. Three major subjective scales are
typically used in order to detect subjective perceptions in participants; these are visual
analog scales (VAS), Likert scales (LS), and Borg scales (Grant et al., 1999). Of these,
VAS and Borg scales demonstrate better detection of sensitivities to change over LS; in
addition VAS appears to be twice as sensitive as Borg scales (Grant et al., 1999). This
has been demonstrated in healthy participants (Grant et al., 1999) as well as in postoperative patients (Myles, Troedel, Boques, & Reeves, 1999). In addition, analog range
scales tend to be a better unit of measurement when studying cases of egotistic biases
(Epley et al., 2004). It is for these reasons that the participants' preferences and personal
opinions of radiation limits, the dependent variables, were measured by visual analog
scales.
Confound Concerns and Work-Arounds
Since the dependent variables were measured by the interactions of internal and
external biases, it is beneficial to know how the participants feel about space travel,
flight, outer atmospheric environments, or human existence beyond planet earth.
Extremely positive or extremely negative preferences of these themes can bias the risk
assessment portion. Participants could not simply be asked beforehand, for this would
encourage several confounds such as anchoring and adjustment, cognitive conservatism,
and other order effects. It is for this reason that opinions of space travel, flight, outer
atmospheric environments, or human existence beyond planet earth were assessed, but
this information was collected only after the risk assessment was performed.
Another confound to be considered is hindsight bias (Birch, 2005; Fischhoff,
1975). If participants were asked about their opinions of risk later in the study, then it
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would be difficult to determine if the answers were their original opinions or if the
answers were the results of persuasion. One aspect of Greenwald's (1980) theory of
cognitive conservatism is that some people desire mental consistency so intensely that
they may not admit a change of opinion even if one has taken place. To determine this,
over 400 participants were surveyed, and VAS was used to measure the sensitivity
between conditions. If there are differences between the means of participant space-travel
preference across each threat condition, then this should be revealed in the data after it is
processed. In this way a trend of participant personal preferences can be detected
regardless of the persuasion to which they were exposed.
Lastly, other biases of order effects must be considered. As previously stated, this
is bias formed by information based on the order in which it was presented. If the
assessment test encouraged anchoring and adjustment, and therefore conjures familiarity
bias, then it would have done so more effectively if it occurred at the beginning or at the
end of the information delivery portion. Although order effects cannot be completely
ruled out in this specific study, other studies have demonstrated that people are less likely
to successfully adhere to information that is placed in the middle of strings of data
(Greenwald, 1980; Morgan & Rotthoff, 2010). Therefore, there was a better chance of
inhibiting FB from the assessment test by placing the test in the middle of the survey. So
that order effects did not confound PB, persuasion was placed evenly throughout the
questionnaire.
The end goal was to determine the opinions that the participants had for the topic
(radiation, LEO, and space travel) without activating the confounding variables (biases)
mentioned above. According to theories of familiarity bias, the more one knows about a
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topic, the more comfort and affiliation they will have for it (Adaval, 2003; Huberman,
2001; Hall et al., 2007); accordingly, there is also a potential for leniency of the risks that
accompany the familiarity (Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001; Kouabenan, 2009). Table 9 lists
the confounds, as well as the work-arounds that were implemented in response to the
studies that were reviewed.
Table 9. Confounds and Work-arounds
Confounds
Anchoring and Adjustment/ Familiarity
Bias
Hindsight Bias

Order Bias (FB)
Order Bias (PB)

Work-around
Cannot ask participant opinion prior to assessing
risk; cannot place knowledge assessment at
beginning of survey
Ask participant opinion after survey; measure
sensitivities between threat conditions and overall
opinions
Place knowledge assessment in middle of survey
Evenly distribute persuasion

Studies like the current experiment were performed by Das et al. (2002), in which
one independent variable involved fear appeals that influenced and induced threat
conditions. In these studies however the other independent variable was the participants’
perceived vulnerability to the threat (stress-induced illnesses) instead of their familiarity
of it. Their results indicated that higher fear appeals resulted in increased effectiveness of
persuasion for participants who perceived themselves as more vulnerable to the threat.
This was the case regardless of the strength of the argument for each threat condition.
Due to the nature of the current study, certain aspects of the Das et al. (2002)
study could not be replicated or carried over. For example, the Das et al. (2002) study,
collected the participants’ perceived vulnerability to the threat in the beginning of the
experiment. In the current study, however, this type of subjective information was
obtained in the middle or end of the experiment in order to avoid anchoring and
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adjustment bias as well as order bias. Table 10 displays the similarities and differences
between the Das et al. (2002) study and the current study.
Table 10. Study Comparisons and Contrasts
Similarities Between Studies
Distributed surveys in order to collect data (contained questionnaires in order to collect DVs)
Use of fear appeals/induced persuasion of threat as IV (contained different threat levels)
Used hidden text within surveys in order to maximize or minimize fear appeals/induced
persuasion of threat
Measured subjective IV (perceived vulnerability in Das et al., 2003; familiarity bias in current
study) by dividing participants in high and low groups

Contrasts
Das et al., 2003
Used fear appeals and action
recommendations (provided information of
how to avoid a health threat)
Used participants’ perceived vulnerability
of threat as the subjective measurement
Collected subjective measurements in the
beginning of experiment
Measured strengths of arguments for each
persuasion condition
Participants were (in Experiment 3)
provided (false) feedback of their subjective
condition: perceived vulnerability to the
threat
Used Likert scales

Current Study
Used fear appeals only
Used participants’ familiarity and preference to
risk activity as the subjective measurements
Collected subjective measurements in the middle
and end of experiment to avoid specific biases
Used the same argument strength across all
persuasion conditions
Participants were not provided feedback on their
subjective condition: familiarity of the activity

Used visual analog scales

Statement of the Hypothesis
Figure 2 shows the hypothesized perception of risks based on the independent
variables. This states that high-familiarity will cause participants to perceive less risk and
be less affected by persuasion; low-familiarity however will be highly affected by the
persuasion conditions. The main questions that were explored were: Will affiliation of a
topic (e.g., radiation in LEO) due to FB result in less concern, and therefore leniency, of
risk? How effective is on-the-spot PB when discussing risk assessment? How well does
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increased FB of a topic, protect against on-the-spot PB? The following hypotheses were
examined:
H0: Variables will show no effect on participant preferences and risk assessment.
H1: High-threat persuasion will result in a lower leniency of risk. Participants in
the high-threat condition will choose lower radiation limits and exposure time reflecting a
low leniency of risk (LLR).
H2: Low-threat persuasion will result in a higher leniency of risk. Participants in
the low-threat condition will choose higher radiation limits and exposure time reflecting a
high leniency of risks (HLR).
H3: The effects of persuasion will be greater in the high-threat condition than in
the low-threat and no-persuasion conditions. The risk of radiation and cancer is a
concern for people. Therefore persuasion will be stronger when it reflects a high-threat
activity than when it reflects a low-threat activity. This will be demonstrated by higher
concerns for risk limits from high-threat scenarios than lower concerns for risk limits
from low-threat scenarios.
H4: High levels of knowledge will reduce differences among persuasion
conditions relative to low familiarity. The different threat conditions will have a lesser
effect on participants with high familiarity; in addition, participants with high familiarity
will perceive less risk regardless of high-threat conditions, low-threat conditions, or no
persuasion conditions. Familiarity bias is often reinforced by confirmation bias (or
cognitive conservatism). This means that people will constantly compare new
information with what they already know and believe. As a result, they are prone to
support their own opinion rather than adopt new positions (Greenwald, 1980).

73
H5: High levels of familiarity of the topic will result in higher leniency of risk.
Because studies have shown that familiarity may result in acceptance of drawbacks and
leniency of threats, those who demonstrate high familiarity with the activity will not be as
concerned with its associated risks.
H6: High levels of familiarity of the topic will result in higher preference of the
activity. Participants with high familiarity of radiation, space, and space travel will

Perception of Threat

demonstrate a favorable position with these topics.

High Familiarity
Low Familiarity

Low Threat

No Persuade

High Threat

Threat Conditions

Figure 2. Hypothesized Perceptions of Risk
Methods
Design
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to compare the effects
of threat persuasion and familiarity level (respectively) on risk assessment and
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preference. This was a fully factorial, 2X3, between-subjects study. Kahneman (2003)
argues that between-subject studies are ideal for this type of test. Within-subject studies
cause participants to look for patterns and form expectations and anticipations; this would
color data and complicate results. The main subject material for this experiment was
radiation, LEO, and space travel. The two independent variables were threat persuasion
levels (1=HighThreat, 2=LowThreat, and 3=NoPersuasion), and familiarity (1=HighFam
and 2=LowFam). The dependent variables were the combined scores of the participants’
preference levels of space travel (PrefAverage) as well as the perceived levels of
radiation risk (RiskAverage).
Figure 3 displays the questions that were used to measure the participants’ final
risk assessments. The visual analog scales were arranged so that a low leniency of risk
was reflected by marks that were placed on the right end of the scales; by comparison, a
high leniency of risk was reflected in marks that were placed on the left end of the scales.
For example, the first question asks the participant how much radiation they would
recommend for one person during one year. If the participant perceived radiation as a
threat, then they would place their marks closer to 0 Sv (towards the right-hand side); this
would mean that they are worried about the effects of radiation, and they recommend that
people should be exposed to as little as possible. In contrast, if the participant did not
perceive radiation as a threat, then they would place their marks closer to 10 Sv (towards
the left-hand side); this would mean that they are not as worried about the effects of
radiation, and that they are comfortable recommending higher exposure doses.

75

One sievert (1), all at once, can cause you to feel mildly ill.
Ten (10) sieverts, all at once, causes death.
The average worldwide background level of radiation (or radiation to which you are already
exposed) is
0.0024 sieverts per year.
What is the max level of radiation exposure you would safely recommend for one person for one
year?
10 Sv

0 Sv

Low earth-orbit is known to reach 0.3 sieverts per year.
What are the maximum allowable days you would safely recommend for one person in lowEarth orbit?
364 days

Figure 3. Risk Assessment Questions

Figure 4 displays the questions that measured preference for the activity
(commercial space travel). In these scales low preference was annotated by placing marks
toward the right hand side of the scale. In contrast, high preference was annotated by
placing marks toward the left hand side of the scale. For example, the first question asks
the participants how enthusiastic they are about space travel. If the participants were not
enthusiastic about the activity then they would place their marks closer towards “Not”
(right-hand side). If they were enthusiastic about the activity then they would place their
marks closer towards “Very” (left-hand side).

1 day
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How enthusiastic are you personally about the prospect of space travel?
Very

Not
How likely would you participate in space travel if given the opportunity?

Likely

Unlikely
If given a chance, would you consider a trip to low-earth orbit?

Definitely

Never
Humans were meant for spaceflight.

Agree

Figure 4. Preference Questions
If participants perceived radiation as more threatening, or simply did not prefer
space travel, then they would annotate marks closer to the right. If they perceived
radiation as less threatening, or preferred space travel, then they would annotate marks
closer to the left. This means that marks placed further to the right represented higher
perceived threat for the risk assessment portions, and they represented a lower preference
for spaceflight in the preference portions.
Participants
A total of 485 surveys were collected. These were students, of varying ages and
backgrounds, from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Questionnaire packets were
administered during class time with the approval of the instructors. The subjects of each
class varied (e.g., psychology & physics) in order to add variety to the sample sizes. No
restrictions were placed on participant criteria; however demographics (such as sex, age,
nationalities, levels of education, and levels of experience) were collected for
informational purposes. Participants were formed into categories depending on which
questionnaire was administered. In order to provide a double-blind study, volunteer
assistants distributed and collected the completed surveys.

Disagree
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Of the 485 surveys that were collected, 76 were discarded due to incompleteness;
this left 409 useable surveys to process. Surveys were then divided into three threat
levels: HighThreat (persuasion that the risks in the activity are a threat), LowThreat
(persuasion that the risks in the activity are not a threat), and NoPersuasion (no
persuasion techniques were intentionally used; bias mitigation was used as often as
possible). Afterwards, in order to separate the participants with high-familiarity from the
participants with low-familiarity, the top and bottom 30% of familiarity assessment
scores were used from each threat condition. As a result, 169 moderate knowledge-level
participants were removed. This then left 240 (N=240) randomly assigned participants
with 40 subjects (n=40) in each of the six groups. Table 11 shows the number of
participants in each group. The moderate knowledge column represents the mid- level
groups that were removed in order to isolate, and compare, the high and low knowledge
sample sizes.

NoPersuade

40

54

40

Lowthreat

Low Knowledge

40

54

40

Highthreat

Table 11. Experimental Conditions with Participants
High Knowledge
Moderate Knowledge

40

61

40

78
Materials
The questionnaires were administered as booklets using average 20-24 weight
paper. They were distributed in person by an assistant, and they were completed at the
participants’ leisure. All information was presented in booklet format. The only exception
was the participant debrief; the debrief was delivered as a full take-away sheet at the
participants’ completion and submission of the questionnaire booklet. The font for all text
was Times New Roman, and the font sizes were as follows: title page-26 points, text
titles-16 points, text body-10 to 11 points. The surveys were administered to participants
in groups in an academic setting. Each participant provided no name, so the data that was
provided was anonymous.
According to Taylor (2009) information should be delivered as briefly as possible
to participants, and participants should retain an adequate amount of information without
allowing them to lose interest due to redundancy. Minimizing the length of time was also
beneficial in the interest of persuading threat. According to Harris and Pashler (2004)
people can adapt to threatening words or material if they are overly exposed to it. This
means that the perception of risk for a specific topic has the potential to decrease over
time.
According to Ubel (2008), the wording should be at a 6th-7th grade reading level.
This level of reading was increased in specific sections of the booklet (e.g., sections
discussing radiation levels). This was not considered to be a problem, however, due to the
college-level education of the participants.
There are several benefits in using a questionnaire survey. One of these is the ease
of administering a double blind interview. Double blind studies make use of a middle-
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man, a volunteer who administers the experimental conditions instead of the
experimenter. Using double-blind studies discourage experimenter bias. Experimenters
may sometimes give clues to participants regarding their experimental conditions. This
can be done unconsciously through body language or other mannerisms. By using the
volunteer to administer packets blindly, then there is less of a chance that the participants
can be affected by non-conscious influences of the experimenter.
Double-blind studies have sometimes been used during face-to-face interactions;
however, the use of questionnaire surveys requires less training and reduces the
likelihood of mishaps regarding the experimenter’s volunteers. In addition, double-blind
studies may be beneficial if the experimenter cannot be present. For example, during
situations where time-constraints are imposed upon a study, the experimenters can utilize
the volunteers to administer the tests to large groups at a time while the experimenters
attend to other peripheral activities of the study (e.g., finances).
The presence of an interviewing experimenter can induce evaluation anxiety (also
known as white coat anxiety in medical settings) which is stress that is induced in some
people when they are being tested or evaluated (Benedetti, 2002; Donaldson et al., 2002;
Strandberg & Salomaa, 2000). Sources of evaluation anxiety can come from uncertainty,
low familiarity with a topic, negative prior experiences with evaluation, excessive ego, or
excessive fear of consequences (Donaldson et al., 2002). Some common consequences of
evaluation anxiety are decreased performance of participants, compromised data
collection, and questionable validity of evaluation results (Donaldson et al., 2002). Since
inducing stress and anxiety can encourage familiarity bias, it benefits the experiment to
minimize this whenever possible. During the procedure itself this was attempted by
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trading face-to-face evaluations with anonymous paper surveys that the participants
completed privately.
Because the surveys can be administered to groups at a time, they allow large
amounts of data collection to be completed in a relatively short amount of time. Some
similar studies have been administered over the internet, however this was not preferred.
Internet surveys are vulnerable to confounds of the participants’ subjective environments
or potential cognitive impairments (e.g., inebriation) that could affect data. Instead, the
surveys were distributed by a volunteer who was able to judge the mental state of the
participants beforehand. The participants were then required to complete the survey in an
academic situation without interference of hazardous environmental stimuli such as
excessive noise.
In summary, the surveys were constructed in a very specific way in order to
optimally encourage certain biases while discouraging others. A double-blind study was
used in order to minimize experimenter bias and to utilize time-efficiency. Anonymous
surveys were distributed to groups at a time in academic settings in order to minimize
evaluation anxiety while still controlling for environmental distractors.
Procedure
Students were naïve as to the real purpose of the experiment. They were given a
brief introduction to the study, and they were told that the information collected will help
the researchers understand public perception of space and space travel. They were then
informed that participation is voluntary, and that participation in the experiment is
consent to the researchers for use of their data.
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Appendices B-R display the full questionnaire in its various conditions.
Experimental independent variables are labeled on each section. The labels identify
persuasion themes: high-threat, low-threat, or no-persuade. These labels were not present
in the booklets that are issued to the participants. Instead participants received only the
sections that matched their specific experimental condition.
The questionnaire began with three introductory sections. The first of these was a
title page containing a first-person anecdote, or quote, from a US astronaut. This was the
first persuasion strategy. The two influential titles were chosen based on the themed bias
of that specific questionnaire (high-threat or low-threat), and no quotes were offered to
the control group (no-persuade). The next introductory section was a personal letter to the
participants from the experimenter. This letter briefly discussed the project and its
implication with Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. It also contained a brief
overview of the questionnaire itself, what the participants could expect during the
process, the proposed time limit for completion, and overall instructions. One of two
biased statements regarding similar findings of radiation was hidden in this section. The
statements were meant to enhance or down-play the mortality data collected from
spaceflight participants, and each statement was delivered based on the threat theme of
the questionnaire. This was the second persuasion strategy. The control group received a
brief historical statement of manned spaceflight and commercial tourism.
The participants were then provided, immediately following the introduction, with
a list of references with which the information in the questionnaire was derived. Placing
these references at this point in the packet is meant to convince the participants that the
packet and researcher were well-sourced. Because perception of a well-sourced informant
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has been shown in previous studies to increase influence of opinion, this was the third
persuasion strategy.
The next section, titled “Section 1: Demographics and Personal Assessment,”
collected the participants’ general information including: sex, age, level of education,
nationalities, education details, and experience. To avoid initiating pre-experiment bias in
the beginning due to egocentric anchoring and adjustment and primacy bias, the
participants were not yet asked their personal views regarding radiation or space travel.
“Section 2: Familiarity Assessment” delivered a ten question quiz about radiation,
LEO, and space travel. This section was intended to detect the participants’ familiarity of
the subject, and the data collected determined familiarity level. Questions were devised to
be as pragmatic as possible and were selected based on their neutrality. The questions
were meant to detect familiarity bias only; therefore no persuasion strategies were used
during this portion.
“Section 3: Waiver Review” was meant to expose the participants to a document
containing a paragraph that describes the topic of interest (commercial space travel), and
it was delivered in a way that the participants would encounter on a pre-activity waiver.
The biased paragraphs were provided to enhance or down-play the dangers of the
radiation environment in LEO; each were delivered based on the threat theme of the
questionnaire. This was the fourth and final persuasion strategy. The control group
received a similar paragraph, however it was provided as contextual information in order
to reduce the possibility of PB forming. Examples of the full waivers are available in the
appendix.
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Two brief opinion questions followed the waiver. These were measured using
visual analog scales. Each consisted of a question and a horizontal line. A word or phrase
(e.g., Always) was placed at the left side of the line, and its opposite (e.g., Never) was
placed on the right side of the line. Participants annotated a mark along the line that best
represented their position on the scale. Each line was gridded in millimeters. The grids
were not visible to the participants, but instead measured points were added and assessed
after the surveys were collected. This section had two purposes. The first purpose was to
allow the participants to reflect on the material they had just read; this caused them to
think critically about the text and the persuasion bias that was hidden within. The second
purpose was to provide a brief tutorial on the visual analog scales so that the participants
were comfortable using these scales before they proceed into the final assessment.
“Section 4: Final Assessment” was broken into two subsections. The first
subsection allowed the participants to propose radiation limits for both spaceflight
participants and the general public by annotating their recommendations on visual analog
scales. The second subsection finally gauged the participants’ personal preferences
regarding the idea of cosmic radiation and space travel. The purpose of this section was
to collect the dependent variable: opinions and recommendations. As mentioned earlier,
the dependent variables were used to identify and measure the influence and interactions
of the two independent variables (familiarity bias and persuasion bias).
Once the packets were completed by the participants, they returned them to the
volunteer student administrator. The administrator collected the surveys, annotated the
survey threat condition on the participant debrief sheet, and then handed the debriefing
forms to the leaving participant. The “Participant Debrief” was intended to expose the
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hidden nature of the experiment and to explain the agendas to the participants in further
detail. It was also used as an opportunity to dissolve any biases that may have been
encouraged during the questionnaire. The debriefing form also provided contact
information of the experimenter in case the participants had any questions about the study
or if they wished to request the project results.
Results
Statistics
Although several studies of risk assessment have utilized Likert scales (Das et al.,
2003; Hirsch & Baxter, 2010), visual analog scales demonstrate superiority with
detecting sensitivities (Grant et al., 1999; Myles et al., 1999), subjective perceptions, and
measurements of egotistic biases (Epley et al., 2004). That is why VAS were used in this
study to collect the D.V.s of the participants. The scales were 80mm in length, and they
were measured from left (low concern for risk or high preference) to right (high concern
for risk or low preference).
Despite the strengths apparent in visual analog scales, there are
inconsistencies among the opinions of scientists on exactly how the data should
be processed. Scientists like Myles et al. (1999) propose that parametric methods
better represent VAS data; they defend that VAS result in wider confidence intervals, that
they support conclusions of linearity, and that their ratio scale properties make them ideal
to parametric tests. In addition, parametric tests, such as t-tests and analyses of variance,
lower Type II error (false negative), and they have been shown to increase power without
increasing Type I errors (false positive) (Myles et al., 1999).
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Scientists like Kersten, Küҫ ükdeveci, and Tennant (2012), however, propose that
VAS are better suited for distribution-free non-parametric methods. They argue that it is a
fallacy to confuse VAS data as interval or ratio, for the data that is derived is ordinal in
nature and does not support ratio or interval calculations. They also argue that the
subjective change in one participant may represent a different magnitude than the change
of another participant, and that the ordinal interpretation of the VAS data takes these
confounds into consideration.
For this experiment, non-parametric tests were performed. This is due, in part, to
the low sample size as well as the apparent ordinal nature of the collected data. Four
Mann-Whitney U tests were used to process the two levels of familiarity (High and Low),
and four Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to process the three levels of threat persuasion
(High, Low, and No Persuasion). These tests were run using Graphpad Prism version
5.04 for Windows (Prism, 2010).
All figures are presented using the box-and-whisker plots provided by Prism’s
(2010) software. In the plots, the “boxes” represent quartiles: the top of the boxes display
the upper quartiles (the 75 percentile place), the bottom of the boxes display the lower
quartiles (the 25 percentile place), and the middle bar within the boxes display the middle
quartile (the 50 percentile place) or the median. The “whiskers” extending from the boxes
represent the highest and lowest values. For example, the risk levels of HighFam for
knowledge-based familiarity (Figure 6) were: highest score- 78, lowest score- 1, upper
quartile- 58.3, lower quartile- 19.5, and median- 40.
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Risk Assessment.
Figure 5 displays RiskAverage across the two knowledge-based familiarity
conditions determined by the familiarity assessment test; Figure 6 displays RiskAverage
across all three threat conditions within the knowledge-based familiarity groups. Figure 7
displays RiskAverage across the two experience-based familiarity conditions determined
by the total years of exposure; Figure 8 displays RiskAverage across all three threat
conditions within the experience-based familiarity groups.
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Figure 5. Risk Averages: Familiarity (Kng.)
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Figure 7. Risk Averages: Familiarity (Exp.)
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Figure 8. Risk Averages: Persuasion (Exp.)
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Preferences.
Figure 9 displays PrefAverage across the two knowledge-based familiarity
conditions determined by the familiarity assessment test; Figure 10 displays PrefAverage
across all three threat conditions within the knowledge-based familiarity groups. Figure
11 displays PrefAverage across the two experience-based familiarity conditions
determined by the total years of exposure; Figure 12 displays PrefAverage across all
three threat conditions within the experience-based familiarity groups. As mentioned
earlier, the y axis represents the millimeters measured on the scales from left to right;
therefore this axis is labeled the “Lack of Preference Level” because higher levels
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Figure 9. Preference Averages: Familiarity (Kng.)
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Figure 10. Preference Averages: Persuasion (Kng.)
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Figure 11. Preference Average: Familiarity (Exp.)
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Figure 12. Preference Averages: Persuasion (Exp.)

Hypotheses.
The Kruskal-Wallis tests discovered no significant differences for the threat
conditions on RiskAverage between knowledge-based familiarities, H(2, N = 240) = .41,
p = .82, or for exposure-based familiarities, H(2, N = 240) = .12, p = .94. Regarding
PrefAverage, results also did not indicate significance for threat conditions on exposurebased familiarity, H(2, N = 240) = .18, p = .91, or knowledge-based familiarity, H(2, N =
240) = .24, p = .89. Therefore no post hoc tests were needed. These findings do not
support hypotheses one through three, which state that the persuasion induced by the
threat conditions will influence perception of risk.
The Mann-Whitney U tests discovered significance between high familiarity and
low familiarity for RiskAverage only within the knowledge-based groups, U=5617, p =
.003. In addition, significance between high familiarity and low familiarity was also
exclusively demonstrated within the knowledge-based groups for PrefAverage, U=5384,
p < .001. Specifically, those with high knowledge-based familiarities demonstrated more
perceived threat of the risks of space travel, but they also demonstrated a greater
preference of the activity. The same results were discovered for experience-based
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familiarity; however results from this type of familiarity were not statistically significant.
These findings do not support hypothesis five (High levels of familiarity of the topic will
result in higher leniency of risk), but they do support hypothesis six (High levels of
familiarity of the topic will result in higher preference of the topic) in regards to
participants with high knowledge-based familiarity.
Discussion
Hypotheses
Results show that participants with higher assessment test scores, reflecting
higher knowledge-based familiarity, had a much greater preference of space travel. Many
of the results failed to show significance in various areas, but this does not mean that
none exists. The results just indicate that effects and interactions were not detected in
some areas according to the methods and other statistical procedures of this study.
Therefore, according to the results procured by the experiment:


High-threat persuasion will not result in a lower leniency of risk.



Low-threat persuasion will not result in a higher leniency of risk.



Persuasion will not be significantly greater in the high-threat condition than in the
low-threat and no-persuasion conditions.



High levels of familiarity will not reduce differences among persuasion conditions
relative to low familiarity.



High levels of familiarity of the activity will not result in a higher leniency of risk.
Instead they may lead to a lower leniency of risk.



High levels of familiarity of the activity (based on knowledge) will result in
higher preference of the activity.
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Limitations and Caveats
Certain controls were implemented earlier in the experiment in order to mitigate
confounds. Some of the confounds included mitigation of undesired participant biases
such as anchoring and adjustment bias or ordering bias. Other limitations or caveats
however still remained. Some of these involved the familiarities of the participants, the
effectiveness of the persuasion that was used, and the abilities of the participants to avoid
perceptions of threat.
Hypotheses four, five, and six discussed that high levels of familiarity will reduce
differences of effects among persuasion conditions, will result in a higher leniency of
risk, and will result in higher preference of the topic respectfully. One reason that results
between participants in the high familiarity and low familiarity levels did not strongly
support these hypotheses may have been due to high levels of familiarity for which the
experiment did not anticipate. All participants were students from Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University (ERAU). ERAU is currently the world’s largest accredited
aeronautical-specific university. Students who attend the university usually have some
basis in aviation, aerospace, or related industries. Furthermore, programs and classes at
ERAU are very aviation and aerospace rich. For these reasons, the participants have
exposure-based familiarity unrelated to the measurement types that were used in this
experiment. The results may be very different if the experiment was performed at other
institutions of learning, or with different samples of participants, that are less exposed
and/or familiar with the topic of space and space travel.
In addition to the familiarity caveat, shortcomings may also exist in the
persuasion conditions. DeMarzo et al. (2003) and Corazzini et al. (2010) explain that
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persuasion sometimes needs to be repeated over long periods of time in order to bias
opinions. This experiment tested on-the-spot persuasion, which is persuasion that lasts
approximately 10 to 20 minutes (about the length of time it would take for a brief
conversation, to listen to a sales pitch, or for a person to read an average informational
pamphlet). Some types of persuasion however may take longer to be effective, or
different types of persuasion may be necessary for shorter exposure times.
The way that the persuasion was delivered may not have been effective enough
for such a short exposure time. According to a meta-analysis performed by Michie,
Abraham, Whittington, McAteer, and Gupta (2009), simply providing information and
advice may not be enough to encourage some people to internalize the concern for certain
health risks. Providing information alone is considered to be a passive intervention, but
the best behavioral change interventions appear to be the ones that lead people into selfregulatory practices. If people are provided active interventions that lead them to
internalize the importance of an activity or the message with which it is associated, then it
will come more automatically to them (Michie et al., 2009). This is understood by
clinical behavioral therapists; they often prescribe homework assignments that patients
use in order to help modify their behaviors (NACBT, 2011). If similar techniques had
been applied to the current experiment then they may have encouraged greater
significance between results. For example, participants could be tasked with a game
beforehand; in the game the participants would carry a radiation-detection meter on them
for 24 hours. Their instructions would be to attempt to avoid areas with higher levels of
radiation (e.g., out in the sun). The winners would be the participants who received the
least amount of radiation during the game’s play period. The purpose of the activity
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would be to encourage participants to be sensitive to the radiation that they encounter.
Therefore it may affect their perception of radiation risks, and this would then affect their
radiation limitation recommendations.
In addition to the self-regulation provided by assigning tasks, the face-to-face
contact between the experimenter and the participants may have produced more powerful
effects with persuasion. This personal one-on-one relationship is another importance
stressed by clinical behavioral therapists, and it appears to be more effective than
delivering information in a non-personal way (e.g., paper survey format) (NACBT,
2011). Caution should be taken however if this method were used. The face-to-face
contact may also encourage evaluation anxiety, and that could produce a carry-over
effect. The carry-over due to evaluation anxiety could affect risk assessment scores and it
may be mistaken for the perceived threat caused by the threat conditions.
Even if the types and amounts of persuasion were appropriate, the way that the
threat is received is still at the mercy of the subjective perceptions of the participants. On
some occasions threatening stimuli or persuasion can become saturated. Smith,
Loewenstein, Jankovich, & Ubel, (2009) found that the impact of negative stimuli can
eventually fade away due to adaptation; this phenomenon is closely related to the
expectations of each person. This means that some people can eventually cease to be
affected by the negative aspects of some things (e.g., threats) no matter how those topics
are delivered. This tends to be very strongly related to optimism bias (Sargeant et al.,
2010) and the Pollyanna effect (Matlin & Stang, 1978). Negative stimuli, like the
persuasion of threat, may be mentally blocked in favor of positive thinking; some people
will mentally avoid attending to threatening information so that it does not induce
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anxiety. This is also known as anxiety-induced avoidance (Öhman et al., 2001). In
addition, Harris and Pashler (2004) also discovered that charged emotional words
eventually lose their hold on people’s attention, and that the words eventually do not
produce the same level of caution after they are used several times. Taken all of this
together, the perceptions of some participants may have, in several types of ways,
developed a resistance to the persuasions of threat. This effect could have been further
reinforced if the participants already had a grounded familiarity with the topic due to
attending ERAU.
One potential work-around for anxiety-induced avoidance is locating participants
who cannot produce this kind of mental aversion. This would involve locating people
sensitive to the specific types of threats, similar to phobics (Das et al., 2003; Klein &
Harris, 2009; Öhman et al., 2001; Senay & Kaphingst, 2009; Sharp et al., 2012), and
placing them through threat conditions similar to the ones used in this study. One
problem with this correction however is external validity: although those threat-sensitive
participants may be more reactive to the threat conditions, using a sample size populated
only by these types of people may not appropriately represent the entire population.
One final consideration involves optimism bias. Although it is difficult to control
for the self-positivity or self-negativity of the participants, detecting them may have
revealed an extra influence that could have had greater weight than familiarity bias. Lin,
Lin, and Raghubir (2003) write that self-positivity can be the product of three sources: a
desire to feel happy, to reduce anxiety, or to increase self-esteem. Future studies would
do well to analyze optimism bias in tandem with familiarity.
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Any one of the aforementioned caveats and limitations may have contributed to
the lack of significance between many of the conditions. Combinations of two or more
could have further exacerbated the results. In addition to the biased-avoiding methods
used by this study, future experiments are encouraged to also be cautious of the other
potential limitations and caveats related to participant backgrounds, participant
perceptions, and types of persuasion techniques.
Conclusion
Applications from the findings of this study suggest that more thorough
techniques should be applied when delivering persuasion. Although other studies support
the efficacy of threat appeals, no substantial results were demonstrated by the techniques
used by this experiment. Furthermore this study supports the idea that some persuasion
techniques may be wasted on people who have high familiarity of the subject, but this is
significantly the case if a high preference of the activity is meant to be preserved in those
people. This is because people with high familiarity may prefer the activity when they are
not under any persuasion techniques.
In the realm of activity projects, such as commercial space tourism, it is important
to understand how automatic thinking shapes the perception of the project organizers as
well as the perception of the paying participants. This is essential for informed consents,
advertising, training programs, and other scenarios that require adequate and accurate
information exchange. Successful safety communication mitigates danger while still
preventing participation attrition.
Regardless of the limitations and caveats that were presented, this study opens the
door for comparison examinations across multiple types of biases. Because all biases may
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not be made the same, an understanding of the interactions between different versions of
them, and their sources, is harmonious with the intensions of human cognition studies:
intensive investigations of behavior, its origins, and its consequences. This study
attempted to tease apart the mental phenomena of bias into more easily identifiable
compartments. Therefore, it also adds to the ever-growing bodies of research that
investigate the individual and social factors that influencing risk assessment and decision
making.
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APPENDIX A
Radiation Environment in Low-Earth Orbit
Low-earth orbit (LEO) is generally considered to be approximately 100 to 1500
miles above the earth’s surface. The International Space Station, at 220 miles, lies within
these limits, but communication satellites extend far beyond them by over 22,000 miles
(Barratt & Lienhard, 2010; Strughold, Haber, Buettner, & Haber, 1951). A topic that is
still uncertain is exactly how people are affected by the radiation environment in LEO. In
order to understand the material that was provided in the experiment, the reader must
have a general familiarity of radiation, LEO, and space travel. This section will introduce
the terms that were used in the study.
Radiation Overview
Radiation is energy in transit. It exists as waves or particles of different
intensities. These properties and intensities determine radiation’s influence once it
encounters matter or other types of radiation (Reitz, 2008). Common types of radiation
are alpha particles, beta particles, and gamma rays (Zapp, 2010). The penetrating power
of these energies, whether they are ionizing or non-ionizing, is determined by the
radiation's strength. Non-ionizing radiation, at wavelengths associated with visible light
and micro waves, is fairly weak and will not disturb the properties of an atom
(UNSCEAR, 2000; UNSCEAR, 2008). Ionizing radiation, at wavelengths associated
with neutrons and gamma rays, is stronger and will destabilize an atom by manipulating
or removing the atom's electrons (Martinez, 2010; NCRP, 2000). This typically happens
when one of an atom's tightly bound electrons is knocked loose from the atom’s orbit.
Radiation then transforms the atom into an ionized, unstable, or radioactive version of
itself (Coderre, 2004; NCRP, 2000).
Radiation is measured by sensitive detection devices like Geiger counters.
Traditionally space radiation has been measured by dosimeters (UNSCEAR, 2000;
UNSCEAR, 2008). Dosimeters are active (particle attracting) or passive (particle
catching) detectors that are designed to identify radiation as it passes through their
monitoring field (NAS/NRC, 2006a; NAS/NRC, 2006b). During space travel these
devices can be worn on astronauts or distributed throughout the spacecraft (Cucinotta et
al., 2002; Reitz, 2008; Zapp, 2010). Detectors that compare radiation against living
tissues are biodosimeters. An example is the tissue equivalent proportional counter
(TEPC). The TEPC was flown in several space shuttle missions; it uses tissue-simulating
plastics and cell-simulating low pressure gases (Dunbar & Boen, 2011; Zapp, 2010). The
amount of information gathered by these devices depend on their sophistication, and
therefore later versions give a much more accurate picture of radiation environments
beyond earth as well as their influence on specific types of human tissues (Johnson,
Golightly, Weyland, et al., 2002; Waters, Bloom, & Grajewski, 2001).
Radiation is categorized according to its behavior and/or how it reacts with
material. Common international standards of radiation measurements are becquerels,
grays, and sieverts. Becquerels (Bq), similar to Curies in the US, are used to describe
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radiation that is emitted from a source; this means that it is radiation moving away from
its point of origin. One Bq is defined as one particle/emitted per second. Grays (Gy),
similar to rads in the US, are the most basic unit of radiation measurement. Gy’s measure
how much radiation is being absorbed by something; this means that it is radiation
moving into its destination. One Gy is defined as one joule of energy absorbed by one
kilogram of material (Coderre, 2004; Cucinotta et al., 2002; Kim, Hu, Nounu, &
Cucinotta, 2010; NCRP, 2000; Zapp, 2010).
Sieverts (Sv), similar to rems in the US, are Grays (Gy; absorbed radiation) that
account for the type of radiation being absorbed or the type material that is absorbing the
radiation. This unit of measurement is used because different types of radiation are more
powerful than others, and each human tissue has different levels of sensitivity when it
encounters ionizing radiation. If Sv’s are stated as an equivalent dose (H) then they
represent a specific type of radiation (e.g. gamma rays, neutrons, etc.); if the Sv’s are
stated as an effective dose (E) then they represent the sum of specific types of tissues in
the human body that are absorbing the energy. Basically a Sv is a Gy that has been
converted based on what it is made out of or where it is being delivered.
Table 12 displays the conversions from Gy’s to each type of Sv’s. For example, if
100 joules of energy are being absorbed by 5kg of material. Then, according to the
absorbed dose portion of the chart, that material is receiving 20Gys of radiation
(100J/5kg=20Gys). If energy that is being absorbed by the 5kg of material are 3 MeV
neutrons, the equivalent dose is 200Sv (H) (20Gys * 10=200Sv).
Table 12. Radiation Dose Conversion Chart
Radiation Dose Conversion Chart
Absorbed Dose (D)
J / Kg
x
Kg

=

Gy

Effective Dose (E)
*

Radiation Weighing
Factor
(WR)
Photons
all energies

=
1

Electr., positr, muons

1

Neutrons, energy:

Sv(H)

*
0.01
Bone
Surface
Skin

Tissue Weighing Factor (WT)
0.05
0.12
Bladder
Breast

Bone
Marrow
Colon

< l0 keV

5

Liver

Lung

10 keV to 100 keV

10

Esophagus

Stomach

>100 keV to 2 MeV

20

Thyroid

>2 MeV to 20 MeV

10

Remainder

>20 MeV

5

=
0.20
Gonads

Equivalent Dose (H)

Figures 13 and 14 show the various levels of intensity of a sievert based on the
equivalent or effective dose. Notice that, when evaluating the type of equivalent radiation
dose, the ratio is 1:1 unless it is comprised of neutrons. This means that one Gy equals
one Sv for all energies except neutron radiation (Coderre, 2004; NCRP, 2000; Cucinotta
et al., 2002; Kim et al., 2010; Zapp, 2010). The three sets of weighing factors were

Sv(E)
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derived from the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)
132 (2000), the International Commission on Radiological Protection report (ICRP) 103
(ICRP, 2007), and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 10 CFR
Part 20 (NRC, 2002).

Figure 13. Equivalent Dose Chart
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Figure 14. Effective Dose Chart
Radiation can come from anywhere that energy is transmitted. On earth, humans
encounter approximately 30% of radiation from space, 52% from the earth, and 18%
from radioisotopes within their own bodies (UNSCEAR, 2000). Radiation encountered in
space is derived from trapped belt radiation, solar particle events, and galactic cosmic
radiation. Trapped belt radiation (or Van Allen Belt Radiation) is defined as terrestrial
(earth-bound) energy that begins approximately 1,860 miles above most of the earth’s
surface (Turner et al., 2008). Belt radiation consists of protons, electrons, energetic
helium, carbon, and oxygen. A solar particle event (SPE) occurs when abnormally large
amounts of coronal energy eject from the sun; this energy showers areas of our solar
system depending on its solar point of origin (Martinez, 2010). SPEs are mostly
comprised of protons, alpha particles, and x-rays (Zapp, 2010). Galactic cosmic radiation
(GCR) is energy that enters our solar system from deep space (Reitz, 2008). GCR can be
generated from special star activity (such as supernovas or black holes) or active galaxies
(Johnson et al., 2002). It is composed of protons, electrons, and high-energy heavier ions
called HZE radiation (ICRP, 2007; NAS/NRC, 2006b; NCRP, 2000; UNSCEAR, 2000;
UNSCEAR, 2008). Aside from direct radiation exposure to solar, cosmic, or terrestrial
radiation, spaceflight participants may encounter something called nuclear secondaries,
or secondary particles, which are the consequences of high-energy radiation as it passes
through high-density material (NAS/NRC, 2006b; Turner et al., 2008). The interaction
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creates and releases new types of energized hydrogen, helium, and other heavier ions
(Coderre, 2004; Zapp, 2010).
Levels of space radiation are higher in or beyond the earth’s atmosphere. This is
because the magnetic field of the earth absorbs and filters certain types of energy.
Therefore radiation is lower at ground-level, and higher in altitude (Cucinotta et al., 2002;
Waters et al., 2001). Beyond the atmosphere, high-threat radiation comes in the form of
SPEs and specific types of GCR (Kim et al., 2010). Two hundred and twenty five (225)
of these solar anomalies have been recognized since 1976 to 2011(Kunches, 2011), and
approximately two hundred and twenty six (226) space missions have overlapped these
periods (Braeunig, 2010). Solar event doses can exceed 50mSv (Kim et al., 2010), which
can be a higher concern in the presence of geomagnetic storms that reduce the strength of
the earth's protective magnetic field. (NAS/NRC, 2006b; Martinez, 2010; Reitz, 2008).
Heavier HZE radiation, found in GCR, is the most complicated type of radiation
encountered in space due to its unpredictable nature. (Cucinotta et al., 2002; Longnecker,
Manning, Worth, 2004; Reitz, 2008). HZE is the most dangerous because of its
penetrating power; it has demonstrated major damage to biological tissues in laboratory
settings (Welton & Lee, 2010; Wilson, Chun, Badavi, et al., 1991).
Radiation Studies in Biology
Relative biological effectiveness (RBE) is another way that radiation is measured
as it passes through living tissue; this is the reaction that occurs between energies and
biology. Information regarding the RBE of radiation has come from various types of
studies including laboratory animals, volunteer convicts, nuclear environment workers,
and radio therapy patients. Data is also derived from real-world events such as the
aftermaths of the Japanese atomic bombings, the accidents at Three-Mile Island and
Chernobyl, and the testing in the Marshall Islands (DOE, 2011; ICRP, 2007; NAS/NRC,
2006a; NCRP, 2000). Collectively, these studies have shown that the human biological
effectiveness of radiation is determined by gender, dose of radiation, current age, age of
first exposure, body mass index (BMI), and the type of tissue exposed (Cucinotta et al.,
2002; NCRP, 2000). In addition it also depends on how much time the person has been
exposed to radiation; this can depend on time in altitude, orbital inclination, and the
period of the sun’s 11 year solar cycle (seven year maximum and four year minimum)
(UNSCEAR, 2000; UNSCEAR, 2008; Waters et al., 2001; Zapp, 2010). The effects of
cosmic radiation can produce further complications in a human body under the effects of
microgravity (Martinez, 2010; Reitz, 2008).
NASA has maintained databases on astronaut health and radiation exposure since
1959, and they have conducted longitudinal studies of astronaut health since 1992. These
studies compare hundreds of male and female astronauts with comparison participants, a
1:3 ratio respectively, in order to detect how spaceflight occupational exposures
contribute to morbidity and mortality. The use of medical histories, physical
examinations, laboratory tests, medical images, and other forms of diagnostic tests are
used as evaluation data (Longnecker et al., 2004).
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The excess relative risk of fatal cancers limit for astronauts is determined based
on a three percent career estimate of cancer mortality. This estimate comes from the data
collected from various human population studies, animal studies, physical phantom
studies, and combined mathematical and computational models (Zaidi & Tsui, 2009). It
means that NASA, the NCRP, and other radiation investigation agencies define a lifetime
career risk of cancer compared to the exposure in the most hazardous types of
occupations. They have agreed that only three percent over the estimate of this
occupation will be tolerated for the activities of US astronauts (ICRP, 2007; NCRP,
2000). Due to readings detected in LEO, three percent is a much higher probability than
is expected in earth orbit, and has therefore been selected by considering longer missions
like those to the moon or potentially to Mars (Cucinotta et al., 2002). It shows that risks
cannot be completely avoided but instead have to be minimized “as low as reasonably
achievable;” this is also known as the ALARA principle (Aurengo et al., 2005; Ball,
2002; NCRP, 2000).
Data is collected and then used in models that develop proposed exposure limits
(Zaidi & Tsui, 2009). Table 13 displays recommendations based on the NCRP (2000) and
the ICRP (2007). Limits according to the NCRP are calculated by the three percent
cancer mortality rating based on gender. Trends continue to show that radiation may have
strong effects on human tissues even in low doses (NAS/NRC, 2006a). In light of these
findings, dose limits for radiation-induced cancers have gotten lower, and they continue
to drop (Cucinotta et al., 2002; NCRP, 2000; Turner et al., 2008). No US astronauts have
ever been documented as reaching a lifetime mortality risk of more than one percent.
Radiation workers also do not typically reach anywhere near the proposed dose limits
(Boice Jr., 2010; Turner et al., 2008), nor due high-altitude pilots who are recognized as
reaching exposures of 1mGy to 5mGy during a lifetime of flying (UNSCEAR, 2008;
Waters et al., 2001).
Table 13. Human Dose Limit Recommendations
1-Year
General
Population

1-Year
Radiation
Workers

1-Year
Medical
Workers

10-Year
Career*

NCRP

ICRP

Human
1mSv
50mSv
5mSv
200mSv
Male
1mSv
50mSv
5mSv
200mSv
Female
1mSv
equivalent
dose
total
limit
once
pregnancy
is
known.
Fetus
1mSv
50mSv
50mSv
1250mSv
Male
1mSv
50mSv
50mSv
750mSv
Female
0.5mSv
equivalent
dose
limit/month
once
pregnancy
is
known
Fetus
* Approximated for exposure at 40 years of age
Biological effectiveness of radiation is also categorized based on the predictability
of its results. Radiation is considered non-stochastic (also known as deterministic) if its
measurements can be directly related to a biological effect; examples of these are
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cataracts and skin burns (Martinez, 2010; NCRP, 2000; Reitz, 2008). Radiation is
stochastic if the effects are more random and cannot be measured by the radiation dose
alone; an example of this is cancer. Deterministic effects normally occur during radiation
in high levels, and stochastic effects occur later and as a result of continuous low-level
radiation (ICRP, 2007; NCRP, 2000).
Damage that occurs in the body as a result of ionizing radiation is classified as
cancers, noncancers, and genetic effects (Cucinotta et al., 2002; ICRP, 2007; NCRP,
2000; Turner et al., 2008). Any of these pathologies can result from a phenomenon called
linear energy transfer (LET). LET is popularly explained as the stopping power
experienced by radiation as it passes through material (Zapp, 2010). It is also the change
that occurs as one type of energy transforms into another type of energy while it moves
through human tissues, cells, or DNA. Some results are oxidation (primarily from lowLET) or direct chromosomal damage (primarily from high-LET) (Reitz, 2008). During
oxidation, radiation enters biological tissue and dislodges orbiting electrons from atoms
within (Weiss & Landauer, 2003). These new unstable atoms then initiate a chain
reaction by dislodging electrons from neighboring atoms (Welton & Lee, 2010). This
causes somatic effects that manifest as free radical damage and cell death (Prasad, Cole,
& Hasse, 2004).
Although oxidation and free radical generation can effectively cause cell death,
they are only loosely associated with DNA damage. Instead, DNA damage tends to occur
through direct contact with the radiation waves or particles (Aurengo et al., 2005;
Coderre, 2004; et al., 2002; Prasad et al., 2004; Zapp, 2010). If damaged chromosomal
molecules cannot be removed or repaired by built-in DNA correcting mechanisms, or if
problems occur during the repair process, then they lead to genetic deletions or
abnormalities that engender gene mutation and cell death (Coderre, 2004; NAS/NRC,
2006a; Welton & Lee, 2010).
Genetic mutations can occur as a result of ionizing radiation, and they can
manifest as abnormal cell propagation (e.g. cancer) and genetic effects, or teratogenic
effects (e.g. birth defects) (Prasad et al., 2004). Both oxidation and direct chromosomal
damage are non-specific, and both can lead to cancers (Welton & Lee, 2010). It takes
only four alterations to DNA for a cell to become cancerous (Coderre, 2004; Cucinotta et
al., 2002; Martinez, 2010). Because cancer is a genetic disease that increases risk with
age, it is influenced by genetic instability from either environmentally-driven or
spontaneous mutations occurring throughout a person’s life (Aurengo et al., 2005; NCRP,
2000). Reactions of radiation on chromosomes can lead to cancer within 5 to 30 years
from exposure (Martinez, 2010). The average time of life loss from radiation induced
cancer death is about 15 years, and the lifetime probability in the US for cancer death is
currently 22%. This is still less than other occupational deaths (et al., 2002; ICRP, 2007).
Other examples of noncancer effects that have been directly tied to radiation
exposure include gastrointestinal problems, muscle problems (such as atrophy), neural
inflammation, premature aging, fatigue, impaired immune system, atherosclerosis,
strokes, cardiovascular damage, rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, and compromised fertility
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(Fang, Yang, & Wu, 2002; Martinez, 2010; Rola, Raber, Rizk, et al., 2004; NAS/NRC,
2006a; Turner et al., 2008). Radiation, even in lower doses, can inhibit growth of new
healthy cells or promote growth of cancerous cells (Aurengo et al., 2005; Zapp, 2010).
The effects can last years after exposure (Martinez, 2010). Defects can manifest even if
there are no immediate detectable signs (ICRP, 2007; Prasad et al., 2004).
One Gy equals one thousand milligrays. Milligrays (mGy) or millisieverts (mSv)
are the preferred type of measurement due to the normally low dosages of radiation that
spaceflight participants encounter (ICRP, 2007; NAS/NRC, 2006b; NCRP, 2000). Figure
15 displays examples of certain biological effects of various doses of radiation; it also
gives examples of levels of radiation encountered in some recognized real-world
scenarios. Historically, the average space mission doses ranged from less than 0.1mGy to
43mGy. US astronauts on the first 43 shuttle missions were exposed to an average of
1.3mGy (Longnecker et al., 2004).

Figure 15. Dose Rates Comparison Chart
Radiation Mitigation
Methods that have been suggested for radiation mitigation are operational
strategies, shielding, and biological countermeasures; according to Cucinotta et al. (2002)
implementations of these can range from 0 to 1000 days and vary in costs. Operational
strategies include time management, pre-activity protection measures, advanced aircraft
propulsion (for shorter flight duration), early and adequate alert systems, and specialized
radiation storm-shelters onboard for short-term higher radiation occurrences (Cucinotta et
al., 2002; Martinez, 2010; Zapp, 2010). One example of an operational strategy is
avoidance of the South Atlantic Anomaly; this is a point where the earth’s magnetic field
dips closer to the planet’s surface (as low as 124 miles above ground level) (NCRP,
2000). Another operational strategy involves planning trips around SPEs. SPEs They are
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fairly unpredictable, but they typically occur during periods of the sun’s seven year solar
maximum (Johnson et al., 2002; NCRP, 2000).
Experiments have demonstrated that secondary particles can be greatly reduced
with shielding that is rich in hydrogen and carbon, like a thermoplastic polymer called
polyethylene, instead of traditional aluminum (Cucinotta et al., 2002). These polymers
have low atomic mass and absorb energy without initiating harmful nuclear secondaries.
They are also cost efficient and dependable types of shielding that protect from most
types of space radiation (Martinez, 2010). In addition, some researchers suggest the
development and use of active shields like electrostatic fields (Townsend, 2000).
Biological countermeasures are applications or alterations to the human body in
order to provide some type of an internal biological protection. Examples of these are
gene therapy, and chemopreventers, as well as drugs and vitamins (antioxidants) that
reduce the likelihood for radiation induced cancerous growths (Atmaca, 2004; Cucinotta
et al., 2002). Many of these techniques have demonstrated success when used on
radiotherapy patients as well as in military applications to protect troops against atomic
blasts (NCRP, 2000; Weiss & Landauer, 2003).
Radiation: Future Studies
Although a lot of useful data has been collected to help assess the presence and
risks of radiation in LEO, more investigation is still needed. Collections of current data
are plagued with complications such as complex relationships, difficult factor control,
low statistical power, and a strong potential for confounds (NCRP, 2000). Some
confounds include carcinogens such as chemical agents, personal lifestyle, or genetics
(Cucinotta et al., 2002). Statistical models have been helpful, but they are not yet
perfected and are possibly inappropriate representations of the actual data (NCRP, 2000;
Zaidi & Tsui, 2009). NASA's longitudinal studies are hampered by inaccurate physical
and psychosocial matches between astronauts and their comparison participants, lack of
vigilance to the detection of minor health problems within their sample size, and high
attrition rates (Longnecker et al., 2004).
Mitigation strategies continue to change as more information is gathered
regarding the characteristics of radiation in LEO and the development of stochastic
effects like cancer (ICRP 2007). The most beneficial methods of protection are those
practiced before the actual flights. Two examples of pre-activity preparation are proper
training for the crew and the participants, and extensive medical screening measures
(Turner et al., 2008). Models continue to test effective, lightweight, and cost effective
shielding (Martinez, 2010; Welton & Lee, 2010; Wilson et al., 1991). Biological
countermeasures like radioprotective supplements demonstrate better results when certain
substances are combined with others; it therefore stands to reason that the best protection
will occur when the right mixtures are met (Fang et al., 2002; Liu, 2010; Prasad et al.,
2004). Because it will take time for new discoveries to become implemented practically,
studies need to take place as soon as possible in order for the results to be used
functionally in commercial spaceflights (Cucinotta et al., 2002).
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APPENDIX B
Initial Statement to the Participant

Please...

Read each section completely before proceeding to the
next,

Do not attempt to compare your survey or answers with
others,

Do not discuss your survey with others until the study is
complete,
(Study should run for 3-6 months)
Retrieve the ‘Debrief’ Sheet from the administer after
you have completed your survey packet.

Thank you.

Human Factors and Systems Department, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
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APPENDIX C
High-Threat Title

The Dangers of Radiation
In
Low-Earth Orbit (LEO)
“It's a very sobering feeling to be up in space and realize that one's safety
factor was determined by the lowest bidder on a government contract.”
“I think all of us certainly believed the statistics which said that probably
88% chance of mission success and maybe 96% chance of survival.”
U.S. Astronaut Alan B. Shepard Jr.
Total Time in Space: 9 days
Condition: Died of Leukemia
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APPENDIX D
Low-Threat Title

Understanding the
Minimal Risks of Radiation
In
Low-Earth Orbit (LEO)
“I think the drive of human beings to explore is evident from history.”
“Everything is accelerating, and we should certainly expect, in the next
century, most of the solar system to be populated.”

U.S. Astronaut Colin Michael Foale
Total Time in Space: Over 374 days
Condition: Living in Houston Texas
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APPENDIX E
No-Persuasion Title

A Brief Look
at
Radiation & Low-Earth Orbit
(LEO)
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APPENDIX F
High-Threat Introduction

To the participant,
To date, more than 50 U.S. and Russian spaceflight participants have died of
cancers, growths, or other related medical complications. These conditions are potentially
traced to the levels of radiation that the participants have encountered during activity in
space. It is therefore in the interest of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and the
Federal Aviation Administration to gauge public awareness of this specific aspect of
space travel. The information exchanged in this survey will help develop a foundational
framework of the public’s perception of cosmic radiation and commercial space travel.
This survey is intended for information collection and distribution. It involves the
investigation “Project: LEO” tasked to members of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University by the Federal Aviation Administration. This packet is broken into five
sections. Please do one section at a time in the sequence provided. You may end the
survey at any time; however you must fill in and submit all sections completely for your
data to be entered into the study. The process is estimated to last no more than 15
minutes. The burden during this process is no greater than can be expected for filling out
a typical commercial questionnaire.
By completing this survey you understand that participation is voluntary, and that
you are giving the experimenters permission to use your data in this project. Be advised
that personal information, like your name, will not be disclosed without your direct and
written consent. Instead, your results will be referenced by a number assigned by the
experimenter. For results and copies of the final report please provide your contact
information to the experimenter. This project will be further explained in the debrief
sheet you will receive upon completion.
We thank you for participating in this study and look forward to receiving your
results.
Sincerely,
Casey Lee Smith
Assistant Researcher
Low-Earth Orbit, Radiation Environment Assessment Team
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
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APPENDIX G
Low-Threat Introduction

To the participant,
To date, a very small percentage of spaceflight participants have exhibited any
dangerous aftereffects as a result of their activities in space. Of those who have shown
illness, it is still uncertain if the effects are due to space travel or other more common
lifestyle causes. It is however in the interest of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
and the Federal Aviation Administration to gauge public awareness of this specific aspect
of space travel. The information exchanged in this survey will help develop a
foundational framework of the public’s perception of cosmic radiation and commercial
space travel.
This survey is intended for information collection and distribution. It involves the
investigation “Project: LEO” tasked to members of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University by the Federal Aviation Administration. This packet is broken into five
sections. Please do one section at a time in the sequence provided. You may end the
survey at any time; however you must fill in and submit all sections completely for your
data to be entered into the study. The process is estimated to last no more than 15
minutes. The burden during this process is no greater than can be expected for filling out
a typical commercial questionnaire.
By completing this survey you understand that participation is voluntary, and that
you are giving the experimenters permission to use your data in this project. Be advised
that personal information, like your name, will not be disclosed without your direct and
written consent. Instead, your results will be referenced by a number assigned by the
experimenter. For results and copies of the final report please provide your contact
information to the experimenter. This project will be further explained in the debrief
sheet you will receive upon completion.
We thank you for participating in this study and look forward to receiving your
results.
Sincerely,
Casey Lee Smith
Assistant Researcher
Low-Earth Orbit, Radiation Environment Assessment Team
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
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APPENDIX H
No-Persuasion Introduction

To the participant,
To date, there have been several manned spaceflights conducted all over the
world. Some participants have displayed illnesses while most have not. Because potential
risks are involved, the welfare of the participants is always the primary concern for this
activity. Several factors, such as the radiation environment in space, are an interest to
researchers. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and the Federal Aviation
Administration have teamed up to gather information and to gauge public awareness of
this specific aspect of space travel. The information exchanged in this survey will help
develop a foundational framework of the public’s perception of cosmic radiation and
commercial space travel.
This survey is intended for information collection and distribution. It involves the
investigation “Project: LEO” tasked to members of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University by the Federal Aviation Administration. This packet is broken into five
sections. Please do one section at a time in the sequence provided. You may end the
survey at any time; however you must fill in and submit all sections completely for your
data to be entered into the study. The process is estimated to last no more than 15
minutes. The burden during this process is no greater than can be expected for filling out
a typical commercial questionnaire.
By completing this survey you understand that participation is voluntary, and that
you are giving the experimenters permission to use your data in this project. Be advised
that personal information, like your name, will not be disclosed without your direct and
written consent. Instead, your results will be referenced by a number assigned by the
experimenter. For results and copies of the final report please provide your contact
information to the experimenter. This project will be further explained in the debrief
sheet you will receive upon completion.
We thank you for participating in this study and look forward to receiving your
results.
Sincerely,
Casey Lee Smith
Assistant Researcher
Low-Earth Orbit, Radiation Environment Assessment Team
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
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APPENDIX J
Demographics Page

Demographics and Personal Assessment
General
Please provide your information:
Sex:

○
Male

○
Female

Age:____________

Education
Current level of education:

○
High School

○
College (undergrad)

○
College (grad)

Field of study:

_________________________________________________________________

Years of study in that field:
____________
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APPENDIX K
Familiarity Assessment Test

Familiarity Assessment
Directions: This section contains 12 questions that will assess your familiarity
about the radiation environment in space. Please answer honestly and without
help from external sources. It is perfectly fine not to know the answer to most of
these questions. Since your identity will remain anonymous, this portion is just
to give the researchers an idea of the average population’s understanding of the
subject.
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Which one of the following is not a main source of radiation encountered in space or
earth orbit?
○ A. Astroidal radiation
○ B. Van Allen belts
○ C. Galactic cosmic radiation
○ D. Solar particle events
○ E. All are equally relevant sources of radiation
Which one of the following is not a unit of radiation measurement?
○ A. Rads
○ B. Sieverts
○ C. Becquerels
○ D. Gammons
○ E. Curies
Which one of the following is considered non-ionizing radiation?
○ A. Microwaves
○ B. Gamma rays
○ C. X-rays
○ D. Charged particles
○ E. None of the above
Which of the following is not a device used to measure levels of radiation
○ A. Dosimeters
○ B. PKE meters
○ C. Geiger counters
○ D. Survey meters
○ E. All are devices used to measure levels of radiation
In regards to radiation, what are considered “secondary particles”?
○ A. Off-spring energies from a combination of two or more types of radiation
○ B. Energized particles produced from radiation and high-density material
○ C. Particles after they lose their radioactivity
○ D. Energized particles that “bleed” off from a larger radioactive source
○ E. None of the above
Effects of radiation are considered stochastic if:
○ A. They are easy to determine
○ B. They are difficult to determine
○ C. They are extremely powerful
○ D. They are extremely weak
○ E. They follow a specific pattern
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In regards to radiation, what are free radicals?
○ A. By-products of solar radiation and the earth’s atmosphere
○ B. By-products of radioactive decay
○ C. Radioactive particles from an unknown source
○ D. Reactive molecules from radiation-induced oxidation
○ E. Ions that hold their charge longer than others
What is the difference between astronauts and cosmonauts?
○ A. Length of time spent in space
○ B. Astronauts belong to the U.S. and cosmonauts belong to Russia
○ C. Cosmonauts do not require government certification in order to travel in space
○ D. Astronauts belong to the U.S. and cosmonauts belong to all other countries
○ E. There are no differences between the two
Who was responsible for the first manned (involving a human) private (non-government)
spaceflight?
○ A. Arianespace (Europe)
○ B. Project Enterprise (Germany)
○ C. SpaceX (United States)
○ D. SpaceShipOne (United States)
○ E. OTRAG (Germany)
Which private company does not claim to offer manned commercial trips into space or
LEO?
○ A. Virgin Group Ltd
○ B. Masten Space
○ C. Space Adventures
○ D. XCOR Aerospace
○ E. SpaceX
Approximately how much are current commercial space companies charging for trips to
LEO?
○ A. $10,000-$90,000
○ B. $100,000-$200,000
○ C. $300,000-$400,000
○ D. More than $500,000
○ E. Over $1 million
What does NASA stand for?
○ A. National Aviation and Space Administration
○ B. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
○ C. National Aerospace and Suborbital Association
○ D. National Aviation and Space Association
○ E. National Aerodynamics and Space Association
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APPENDIX L
Waiver Introduction

Waiver Review
Directions: You will now be shown a waiver as you might see before
participating in commercial space travel. DO NOT FILL OUT OR SIGN THE
WAIVER. Instead, imagine you are about to volunteer for space travel, and read
the document carefully before proceeding to the next section.
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APPENDIX M
High-Threat Waiver
SPACETOURS INC

Liability Release • Waiver • Discharge • Agreement Not to Sue
THIS IS A RELEASE OF YOUR RIGHTS, READ CAREFULLY AND
UNDERSTAND BEFORE SIGNING.
I ______________________________ understand that this is a legally binding Release,
Waiver, Discharge and Agree Not to Sue, made voluntarily by me, on my own behalf,
and on behalf of my heirs, next of kin, distributes, executors, administrators, guardians,
legal representatives, and assigns to SpaceTours Inc.
I understand and acknowledge, as the undersigned Releasor, that I fully recognize that
there are dangers and risks to which I may be exposed by participating in commercial
space travel (the “Activity”). Some of these include the following:
Flight: Flying in private aircraft necessarily entails the risk of bodily injury, death
and property damage from pilot error or other operational errors. In addition, high
altitude flights could result in injuries from a combination of factors including but not
limited to: mechanical failure, negligent maintenance, range and altitude limitations of
aircraft, defects in runways, unimproved landing strips, interference by wildlife, limited
or nonexistent air traffic control and radar coverage in remote areas, limited instrument
approach procedures to airports, difficult search and rescue in remote areas, unfavorable
weather or terrain conditions, latent defects in aircraft, the possibility of contaminated
fuel, terrorist acts, lack of sufficient security for aircraft and personnel, or other causes.
Radiation: Although the earth’s magnetic field protects from several forms of
radiation at sea-level, this protection diminishes substantially in higher altitudes. The
atmosphere, aircraft shielding, and other types of mitigation cannot completely protect
the space traveler from encountering some of this radiation. Even in small doses, it can
accumulate over time and promote harmful, unpredictable, and even fatal medical
conditions. While some studies make claim that modest low-doses of radiation contribute
to biological repair and adaptation, other studies adamantly reveal that it can cause
immediate health defects as well as dormant threats that could eventually compromise
fertility and genetic stability. Of the known data collected over fifty spaceflight
participants have died of some type of lethal illness. Because deadly diseases (e.g.,
cancer) typically reflect a lifetime exposure to noxious environmental contributors, like
chemical agents, genes, diets, and other lifestyle choices, then lingering in irradiated
environments (e.g., low-earth orbit) can expedite these biological risks.
As the undersigned Releasor, I want to participate in this activity despite the possible
dangers and risks and despite this Release.
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I agree, as the undersigned Releasor, with informed consent and for valuable
consideration received (including assistance provided by SpaceTours Inc), that I forever
assume all of the risks and responsibilities in any way arising from or associated with this
Activity, and I irrevocably release SpaceTours Inc and all of its affiliates, divisions,
departments and other units, committees and groups, and their respective governing
boards, officers, directors, principals, trustees, legal representatives, members, owners,
employees, student volunteers, agents, administrators, assigns, and contractors, from any
and all claims, demands, suits, judgments, damages, actions and liabilities of every name
and nature whatsoever, whenever occurring, whether known or unknown, contingent or
fixed, at law or in equity, that I may suffer at any time arising from or in connection with
the Activity, including any injury or harm to me, my death, or damage to my property.
I agree and affirm that I have had instruction, that I understand all aspects of the
activity, and that I understand the language used in this Release. I also affirm that I have
adequate medical or health insurance to cover any medical assistance I may require, and
that I have no physical infirmity or chronic ailment whatsoever except those previously
declared. I am not taking any medications of any kind, and I have not taken any alcoholic
beverages or drugs within the last twelve hours. I agree not to participate in the activity
unless I am medically able and properly trained, and I agree to abide by the decision of
the SpaceTours Inc official or agent, regarding my approval to participate in spaceflight.
I have read this entire Release. I fully understand the entire Release and
acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to review this Release with an attorney
of my choosing if I so desire, and I agree to be legally bound by the Release.

SIGNATAURE OF RELEASOR
Date: _________________________
Signature ______________________
Print Name: ____________________
In case of emergency, contact:

Relationship:

WITNESS TO SIGNATURE
Date: _________________________
Signature ______________________
Print Name: _____________________
Telephone:
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APPENDIX N
Low-Threat Waiver
SPACETOURS INC

Liability Release • Waiver • Discharge • Agreement Not to Sue
THIS IS A RELEASE OF YOUR RIGHTS, READ CAREFULLY AND
UNDERSTAND BEFORE SIGNING.
I ______________________________ understand that this is a legally binding Release,
Waiver, Discharge and Agree Not to Sue, made voluntarily by me, on my own behalf,
and on behalf of my heirs, next of kin, distributes, executors, administrators, guardians,
legal representatives, and assigns to SpaceTours Inc.
I understand and acknowledge, as the undersigned Releasor, that I fully recognize that
there are dangers and risks to which I may be exposed by participating in commercial
space travel (the “Activity”). Some of these include the following:
Flight: Flying in private aircraft necessarily entails the risk of bodily injury, death
and property damage from pilot error or other operational errors. In addition, high
altitude flights could result in injuries from a combination of factors including but not
limited to: mechanical failure, negligent maintenance, range and altitude limitations of
aircraft, defects in runways, unimproved landing strips, interference by wildlife, limited
or nonexistent air traffic control and radar coverage in remote areas, limited instrument
approach procedures to airports, difficult search and rescue in remote areas, unfavorable
weather or terrain conditions, latent defects in aircraft, the possibility of contaminated
fuel, terrorist acts, lack of sufficient security for aircraft and personnel, or other causes.
Radiation: Most of the radiation encountered on earth, as well as the higher levels
in low-earth orbit, is minimal. It is a typical part of the environment, but increased levels
have been correlated with some illnesses. Because of partial protection by the earth’s
atmosphere, as well as shielding and other mitigation technologies, a large portion of
energies are never received by space travelers. While some studies make claim that
modest low-doses of radiation contribute to major illness, other studies adamantly reveal
that it can actually lead to chromosomal repair, protection, and biological adaptation. Of
the known data collected, less than a tenth of spaceflight participants have died from any
illness potentially related to space flight. Although radiation cannot be ruled out, illnesses
are more likely caused by other factors such as chemical agents, genes, diets, and other
lifestyle choices.
As the undersigned Releasor, I want to participate in this activity despite the possible
dangers and risks and despite this Release.
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I agree, as the undersigned Releasor, with informed consent and for valuable
consideration received (including assistance provided by SpaceTours Inc), that I forever
assume all of the risks and responsibilities in any way arising from or associated with this
Activity, and I irrevocably release SpaceTours Inc and all of its affiliates, divisions,
departments and other units, committees and groups, and their respective governing
boards, officers, directors, principals, trustees, legal representatives, members, owners,
employees, student volunteers, agents, administrators, assigns, and contractors, from any
and all claims, demands, suits, judgments, damages, actions and liabilities of every name
and nature whatsoever, whenever occurring, whether known or unknown, contingent or
fixed, at law or in equity, that I may suffer at any time arising from or in connection with
the Activity, including any injury or harm to me, my death, or damage to my property.
I agree and affirm that I have had instruction, that I understand all aspects of the
activity, and that I understand the language used in this Release. I also affirm that I have
adequate medical or health insurance to cover any medical assistance I may require, and
that I have no physical infirmity or chronic ailment whatsoever except those previously
declared. I am not taking any medications of any kind, and I have not taken any alcoholic
beverages or drugs within the last twelve hours. I agree not to participate in the activity
unless I am medically able and properly trained, and I agree to abide by the decision of
the SpaceTours Inc official or agent, regarding my approval to participate in spaceflight.
I have read this entire Release. I fully understand the entire Release and
acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to review this Release with an attorney
of my choosing if I so desire, and I agree to be legally bound by the Release.

SIGNATAURE OF RELEASOR
Date: _________________________
Signature ______________________
Print Name: ____________________
In case of emergency, contact:

Relationship:

WITNESS TO SIGNATURE
Date: _________________________
Signature ______________________
Print Name: _____________________
Telephone:
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APPENDIX O
No-Persuasion Waiver
SPACETOURS INC

Liability Release • Waiver • Discharge • Agreement Not to Sue
THIS IS A RELEASE OF YOUR RIGHTS, READ CAREFULLY AND UNDERSTAND
BEFORE SIGNING.
I ______________________________ understand that this is a legally binding Release,
Waiver, Discharge and Agree Not to Sue, made voluntarily by me, on my own behalf,
and on behalf of my heirs, next of kin, distributes, executors, administrators, guardians,
legal representatives, and assigns to SpaceTours Inc.
I understand and acknowledge, as the undersigned Releasor, that I fully recognize that
there are dangers and risks to which I may be exposed by participating in commercial
space travel (the “Activity”). Some of these include the following:
Flight: Flying in private aircraft necessarily entails the risk of bodily injury, death
and property damage from pilot error or other operational errors. In addition, high
altitude flights could result in injuries from a combination of factors including but not
limited to: mechanical failure, negligent maintenance, range and altitude limitations of
aircraft, defects in runways, unimproved landing strips, interference by wildlife, limited
or nonexistent air traffic control and radar coverage in remote areas, limited instrument
approach procedures to airports, difficult search and rescue in remote areas, unfavorable
weather or terrain conditions, latent defects in aircraft, the possibility of contaminated
fuel, terrorist acts, lack of sufficient security for aircraft and personnel, or other causes.
Radiation: Radiation exists in the environment both at sea-level and, to a slightly
larger degree, higher in the atmosphere. Most of this radiation is blocked by the
atmosphere, shielding, and other mitigation technologies. Given the right circumstances,
modest low-doses of radiation can cause destructive as well as beneficial biological
effects. Several humans have traveled high into, or beyond, earth’s atmosphere. Of the
known data collected, some space flight participants later displayed illnesses while others
did not. Researchers have concluded that any of these medical complications may have
been affected by cosmic radiation as well as other environmental contributors such as like
chemical agents, genes, diets, and other lifestyle choices.
As the undersigned Releasor, I want to participate in this activity despite the possible
dangers and risks and despite this Release.
I agree, as the undersigned Releasor, with informed consent and for valuable
consideration received (including assistance provided by SpaceTours Inc), that I forever
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assume all of the risks and responsibilities in any way arising from or associated with this
Activity, and I irrevocably release SpaceTours Inc and all of its affiliates, divisions,
departments and other units, committees and groups, and their respective governing
boards, officers, directors, principals, trustees, legal representatives, members, owners,
employees, student volunteers, agents, administrators, assigns, and contractors, from any
and all claims, demands, suits, judgments, damages, actions and liabilities of every name
and nature whatsoever, whenever occurring, whether known or unknown, contingent or
fixed, at law or in equity, that I may suffer at any time arising from or in connection with
the Activity, including any injury or harm to me, my death, or damage to my property.
I agree and affirm that I have had instruction, that I understand all aspects of the
activity, and that I understand the language used in this Release. I also affirm that I have
adequate medical or health insurance to cover any medical assistance I may require, and
that I have no physical infirmity or chronic ailment whatsoever except those previously
declared. I am not taking any medications of any kind, and I have not taken any alcoholic
beverages or drugs within the last twelve hours. I agree not to participate in the activity
unless I am medically able and properly trained, and I agree to abide by the decision of
the SpaceTours Inc official or agent, regarding my approval to participate in spaceflight.
I have read this entire Release. I fully understand the entire Release and
acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to review this Release with an attorney
of my choosing if I so desire, and I agree to be legally bound by the Release.

SIGNATAURE OF RELEASOR
Date: _________________________
Signature ______________________
Print Name: ____________________
In case of emergency, contact:

Relationship:

WITNESS TO SIGNATURE
Date: _________________________
Signature ______________________
Print Name: _____________________
Telephone:
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APPENDIX P
Waiver Assessment
Directions: Below are questions regarding the waiver that you just read. Please
annotate your answers by placing a mark in the area of the scales that you feel is most
appropriate.
Example:
Agree
Disagree

How clearly did the waiver state the agreement?
Very Clearly

Not Clearly

Do you think that the waiver is appropriate for this kind of activity?
Yes

No
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APPENDIX Q
Recommendation and Preference Test

Final Assessment
Directions: On the scales below, mark the limits that you personally feel should be implemented. There
is no right answer. The point of this exercise is to assess population preferences.
One sievert (1), all at once, can cause you to feel mildly ill.
Ten (10) sieverts, all at once, causes death.
The average worldwide background level of radiation (or radiation to which you are already
exposed) is
0.0024 sieverts per year.
What is the max level of radiation exposure you would safely recommend for one person for one
year?
10 Sv

0 Sv

Low earth-orbit is known to reach 0.3 sieverts per year.
What are the maximum allowable days you would safely recommend for one person in low-Earth
orbit?
364 days

1 day

How enthusiastic are you personally about the prospect of space travel?
Very

Not

How likely would you participate in space travel if given the opportunity?
Likely

Unlikely

If given a chance, would you consider a trip to low-earth orbit?
Definitely

Never

Humans were meant for spaceflight.
Agree
In addition, what problem do you believe is the most likely to happen to space travelers?
○ A. Crashes
○ B. Complications due to radiation exposure
○ C. Complications due to pressure fluctuations and oxygen
○ D. Complications due to anxiety
○ E. Other (please explain):

Disagree
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APPENDIX R
Debrief

Participant Debrief
Thank you for participating in this study. Your information will assist Embry Riddle Aeronautical
University and the Federal Aviation Administration in further understanding the public
perception of risk and the radiation environment in low-earth orbit. In addition, your contribution
allows us to examine the effects of bias forming on risk perception. During this experiment you
may have been exposed to specific persuasion techniques. These were scattered throughout the
entire survey, and they were planted in an attempt to persuade your opinions regarding the
subject. Depending on which survey you received, you encountered persuasion that intended to
encourage one of the three conditions:
1. Radiation environment in low-earth orbit is a threat.
2. Radiation environment in low-earth orbit is not a threat.
3. You received no influence or persuasions.
Please check the back of this debrief to identify your specific condition. The performance of all
participants will be evaluated in order to determine whether persuasion bias or familiarity bias
(bias depending on your prior level of knowledge measured by the Familiarity Assessment) can
be used to predict the outcome of bias forming.
Radiation and space travel are interesting and complicated subjects. There still remain several
valid arguments between professionals regarding the risks. All-in-all radiation risk in orbital
spaceflight has not been shown to be very substantial, but dangers are still present and could be
concernable under certain circumstances. We highly recommend that you perform research of
your own before committing to any final conclusions. Copies of this finished study will be
available upon request.
We respectfully requested that you not discuss what you have encountered during this experiment
until after the results are published.
If you have any questions regarding this project, your participation in the project, or copies of the
results, please feel free to contact the researcher (Casey) at smith7a5@my.erau.edu, (386) 8718164, or through the Human Factors and Systems department of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University. Results of this study will be published and placed in the Hunt Library (Daytona Beach
Campus) upon completion of this project. It may take up to six (6) months to complete and
organize everything, so please be patient.
********************************************************************

Thank you again for your contribution!

